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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of my thesis is to develop a description of the evolutionary 
phenomenon of exaptation — new usages of previous existing biological traits, 
whether they be already functional or not — within the modeling framework of 
C. S. Peirce’s theory of signs. At the same time, in line with the approach of the 
coiners of the term, reference is made to modes of evolution complementary to 
the formulation based on genetic mutations, natural selection and adaptation; 
specifically, attention is paid to the role of lifetime behavioral changes able to 
modify the organism’s ecological setting and, as a consequence, to start differ-
ent evolutionary pathways. Perception is emphasized as the common element 
linking such view with Peirce’s phenomenology and a generalized conception 
of hypothetical inference is provided to accomplish the modeling. 
The term and the concept of exaptation were first introduced in Gould and 
Vrba (1982) and further developed in Vrba and Gould (1986): it refers to “such 
characters, evolved for other usages (or for no function at all), and later 
“coopted” for their current role […]. They owe their fitness to features present 
for other reasons, and are therefore fit (aptus) by reason of (ex) their form, or ex 
aptus” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6). One of the best analysis and operational applica-
tion has been provided by Arnold (1994), while Gould (2002) dwells exten-
sively on the topic. The casuistry of exaptive phenomena is wide: useful 
reviews are Coddington (1988); Buss et al. (1998); Gregory (2008); McLennan 
(2008); Thanukos (2009). A list of Gould’s essays and articles dealing with 
different kind of exaptations can be found in Pievani (2008).  
The concept has been proved fecund in the field of molecular evolution too 
(Gould 2002: 1234–1246), in the context of evolutionary innovations (Wagner 
2012: 106; Barve, Wagner 2013) and it is central in the framework of evolution-
ary developmental biology (Carroll 2005); besides, it has been used to describe 
some crucial turns in the evolution of hominids and Homo sapiens (Tattersall 
1998, 2002; Linde-Medina 2011). The human brain is considered a particular 
“field of exaptations” (Pievani 2003: 78-89; Gould 2002; Anderson 2007), 
along with consciousness (Gould 1984; Pievani 2002: 327; Humphrey 1986; 
1992), language (Traugott 2004; Hauser et al. 2002; Deacon 1997) and many 
other areas of human culture: religion (Gould 1984), morality (Chapman et al. 
2009), sociality (Brown, Feldman 2009; MacDonald, Leary 2005), technology 
(Cattani 2005; Arthur 2009; Allen, Andriani 2007) and economics (Dew et al. 
2004). 
In linguistics, exaptation has been used to account for the change whereby 
lexical terms and constructions come in certain contexts to serve grammatical 
functions or to develop new ones: Lass (1990; 1997), Traugott (2004), Fanego 
(2004) and Narrog (2007). Within semiotics, Sebeok (1984; 1985a; 1985b, 
1991) was one of the first proponents to introduce the term; in biosemiotics, it 
has been used for instance by Stjernfelt (2007), Vehkavaara (2002), Maran and 
Kleisner (2010), Artmann (2004). 
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The aim of this introductory section is to show how the three papers consti-
tuting the research project, however heterogeneous and dealing with different 
topics, are in fact animated by a common design that has come to assume 
progressively a more clearly defined profile. At the same time, new insights and 
knowledge have been collected since the last publication, so that their integra-
tion makes the introduction as such to stand out as an autonomous piece of 
work.  
The method adopted is the same as in the papers: on one hand, a selective 
review of the scientific, semiotic and philosophical literature focusing both on 
exaptation and connected fields of inquiry; on the other hand, personal elabora-
tions on that material. In addition, a case study is included, so as to allow the 
overall speculative styling to be paralleled by a more strictly empirical dimen-
sion, especially through the proposal of possible laboratory experimentations 
capable of testing the suggested hypothesis.  
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1. BEFORE EXAPTATION:  
PREADAPTATION AND CHAUNCEY WRIGHT 
The first article (Weible 2012b) has established the basic setup within which 
later investigations have been carried on. Firstly, it stresses (also Gould, 
Lewontin 1979) the necessity to take into account possible alternative evolu-
tionary trajectories and explanations leading to the property of a biological trait 
to promote fitness, whether it be an organ, a physiological process or a 
behavior. In this respect, along with the process of progressive genes-driven 
refinement towards optimality and attunement to relatively stable environmental 
conditions, there appears evident another key factor enhancing survival, namely 
the potential of morphological, behavioral and biochemical features to be 
applied to new usages.  
Since absolute, ex novo functional recruitments are rather rare, peculiar rele-
vance assumes that subset of situations where “a character, previously shaped 
by natural selection for a particular function (an adaptation), is coopted for a 
new use” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 5). This is the specific type of exaptation 
addressed by the case study, with a further qualification concerning the mecha-
nism driving the cooption: the focus of attention is put on readjustments follow-
ing those changes in the ethological rules of survival (Weible 2012a: 77) which 
are not triggered by genetic mutations, but instead due to organisms’ behavioral 
plasticity. 
As for Gould’s and Vrba’s historical forerunners (Weible 2012a: 77–79), the 
references already mentioned need to be extended in order to provide an over-
view as much representative as possible of a debate that, although not in the 
same terms, has spread over more than a century. Beyond its linguistic innova-
tion, the notion of exaptation exhibits a background dating back to the sixth 
chapter (“Difficulties on theory”) of the first edition of Darwin’s On the Origin 
of Species (1859) and to the seventh chapter (“Miscellaneous objections to the 
theory of natural selection”) added in the sixth edition (1872). Besides, an under-
standing close to F. Jacob’s idea of evolution as tinkering (1977) — a process 
strictly linked to phenomena of biological co-option (Pievani 2003: 75) — is 
contained in Darwin’s book (1862) on the fertilization of orchids by insects:  
 
Although an organ may not have been originally formed for some special 
purpose, if it now serves for this end we are justified in saying that it is 
specially contrived for it. On the same principle, if a man were to make a 
machine for some special purpose, but were to use old wheels, springs, 
and pulleys, only slightly altered, the whole machine, with all its parts, 
might be said to be specially contrived for that purpose. Thus throughout 
nature almost every part of each living being has probably served, in a 
slightly modified condition, for diverse purposes, and has acted in the 
living machinery of many ancient and distinct specific forms. (Darwin 
1862: 368) 
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After Darwin’s work, analogous ideas — one-to-many and many-to-one 
dynamical relations between structure and function; recycling and reassembling 
of existing traits; low specialized organs to be developed towards better adapta-
tions; and so forth — did not stop circulating. The following quotation by 
Raabe (1971: 1), taken from an article on the theories of A. N. Sewertzoff, is 
emblematic in this respect: 
 
In his work of 1931 Sewertzoff accepted conscientiously and broadened 
the following concepts: Dohrn's "principle of the change of organ func-
tion" (1875), Kleinenberg's "principle of organ substitution" (1886), 
Plate's "principle of the function extension" and "principle of function 
intensification" (1924), and finally Fedotov's "principle of physiological 
substitution" (1927).  
 
Sewertzoff himself added new tenets — “phase fixation, extinction of mediat-
ing functions, reduction of the function number, substitution of functions, 
immobilization of functions, similarization of functions, and division of organs 
and functions” (Raabe 1971: 1) — and formulated a principle of multi-function-
ality that closely reminds, more than 60 years beforehand, Arnold’s distinction 
(1994: 138) between “addition exaptations” (a second use is added to the first) 
and “transfer exaptations” (the shift to a new use with loss of the old). For 
example, presumably “when the ancestors of carnivorous hemipteran bugs 
transferred from sucking sap on feeding on the internal fluids of animals, there 
was at least a brief phase where they did both. So their hypodermic proboscis 
was initially an addition exaptation to exploiting animal fluids, but later became 
a transfer exaptation” (Arnold 1994: 138). This quotation (which has plainly 
suggested the case study on blood-sucking addressed in the last section of the 
introduction) shares close affinity with the following: 
 
The principle of the primary multifunctionality of organs, as assumed by 
Sewertzoff […] means that an organ after having been already formed 
but not yet specialized, possesses a possibility of performing a certain 
number of functions. One of them becomes its main function, the others 
are secondary. In the subsequent development of the organ, a loss of 
secondary functions may occur and the organ becomes distinctly special-
ized. A predominance of another less important function may take place 
which assumes the character of the main function and even of the single 
one only. (Raabe 1971: 1) 
   
Such similarities should not astonish, given a strong and widespread awareness 
of the issue among evolutionary biologists since Darwin’s publications. After 
their early inception into the discussion, changes and extensions of functions 
have always been heavily debated topics, mainly because of the problematic 
aspects related to the precise identification of their reasons of origin. Analogous 
considerations (often under the same label of preadaptation, though not neces-
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sarily coherent with each other as for its explanation) are contained in the works 
of several scholars: Davenport (1903), Morgan (1903), Cuénot (1911; see also 
Fisher, Stock 1915; Limoges, 1976; Gayon, 1995), Shull (1936), Goldschmidt 
(1940), Huxley (1942), Simpson (1944), Dobzhansky (1955), Bock (1959), 
Mayr (1959; 1982), Osche (1962). However, what is surprising is the relative 
lack of recognition of the philosophical root of the issue, which deeply influ-
enced the author of the Origin himself. 
 
C. Wright (1830–1875) was an American philosopher and mathematician who 
participated, together with Ch. S. Peirce, W. James and other intellectuals, to 
the informal discussion group known as The Metaphysical Club, held firstly in 
Cambridge in 1872. Though an almost forgotten thinker, recently there has been 
a reprint of his major writings and letters (Ryan, Madden 2000), which offers an 
overview of his several interests and testifies the key role played by his ideas 
within the history of the interpretations of biological evolution (for current 
applications of Wright’s thought within a semiotic and biological perspective, 
see Ostdiek 2011; 2012; 2015). After having welcomed enthusiastically On the 
Origin of Species, he was one of the first “to defend Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection, and to publish applications of that theory to […] biological problems” 
(Wiener 1949: 31); he “produced the most level-headed discussions of his time 
concerning the philosophical meaning of Darwin’s work” (Wiener 1949: 32).  
Specifically, Wright published a series of essays in the North American 
Review meant to counter critiques raised against Darwin’s theory. The first 
article (“Limits of natural selection”, 1870) was a critical review of A. R. 
Wallace’s The limits of natural selection as applied to man (1869) and took as a 
polemical target the idea that Darwin’s natural selection could not be respon-
sible for the origin of man’s most distinctive features, thereby leaving space to a 
supernatural principle justifying the gap with other living beings. The second 
(“The genesis of species”, 1871: a critical review of St. G. Mivart’s On the 
Genesis of Species, 1871) and third article (“Evolution by natural selection”, 
1872, a counter-reply to the letter Mivart sent to Wright’s editor in response to 
his critique) contained a careful unmasking of several misunderstandings 
(including the wrong interpretation of the concept of ‘accident’ and the mis-
taken belief that Darwin was deeming natural selection as the sole agent to be 
accounted for evolutionary changes), as well as refutations of the doctrine of the 
‘specific genesis’ and discontinue transformations. 
Darwin read the first essay and quoted Wright in two positive notes of his 
Descent of Man (1871; further direct references to the philosopher can be found 
in the sixth edition of the Origin, 1872, and in the second edition of the 
Descent, 1874). When in June 1871 Wright sent to Darwin a letter containing 
the drafts of his second article (“The genesis of species”), they started an assid-
uous epistolary relationship that went on till 1875, year of the untimely death of 
Wright. The English naturalist was impressed to such a point by Wright’s deep 
understanding of the theory of natural selection that he himself, at his own 
expenses, published in England the same article. In 1872 they met in person 
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during Wright’s trip to Europe and later on Darwin asked him to apply the 
theory of descent with modifications to such complex human traits as will, self-
consciousness and language, which resulted in the philosopher’s most important 
work: “The evolution of self-consciousness” (1873).  
Wright’s critical considerations were also directed against Darwin himself. 
For instance, “[h]e has not in his works repeated with sufficient frequency his 
faith in the universality of the law of causation” (Wright 1877: 130–131) — and 
that was exactly the reason behind Mivart’s misconception about how natural 
selection really operates; besides, in “The genesis of species” he quoted an 
excerpt from The Descent of Man to emphasize Darwin’s self-criticism regard-
ing this principle: “I now admit that in the earlier editions of my 'Origin of Spe-
cies' I probably attributed too much to the action of Natural Selection, or the 
survival of the fittest […]. I had not formerly sufficiently considered the exist-
ence of many structures which appear to be […] neither beneficial nor injurious; 
and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my 
work” (Wright 1877: 138–139; cf. Darwin 1871: 152).  
To my knowledge, the Italian philosopher Parravicini (2009/2010) has been 
the only scholar to recognize the conceptual connection between Wright’s 
principle of new uses of old powers, meant to amend anthropomorphism within 
the theory of evolution, and the contemporary notion of exaptation: just as the 
latter questions the idea of identifying present utilities and reasons for selection, 
so Parravicini defines as a “genetic fallacy” (Parravicini 2009/2010: 282; my 
translation) the attitude to take the results of a process and retrocede them at the 
beginning, as if the effects were the antecedent cause. Wright acknowledged the 
existence of such interpretative twist since his first article-review (1870; cf. 
Parravicini 2009/2010: 309–310) regarding Wallace’s theory. Subsequently, it 
was adopted both in the critical review (1871) of Mivart’s book and the coun-
ter-reply (1872) to his answer, to end up with an extensive and detailed applica-
tion to the origin of language and use of signs in his “The evolution of self-
consciousness” (1873). In our context, the incipit of the last essay is worth quot-
ing in its entirety:  
 
The truth is, on the contrary, that according to the theory of evolution, 
new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and men-
tal natures of the animal, and in its individual developments, as well as in 
the development of its race, although, at their rise, these uses are small 
and of the smallest importance to life. They seem merged in the powers 
to which they are incident, and seem also merged in the special purposes 
or functions in which, however, they really have no part, and which are 
no parts of them. Their services or functions in life, though realized only 
incidentally at first, and in the feeblest degree, are just as distinct as they 
afterwards come to appear in their fullest development. The new uses are 
related to older powers only as accidents, so far as the special services of 
the older powers are concerned, although, from the more general point of 
view of natural law, their relations to older uses have not the character of 
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accidents, since these relations are, for the most part, determined by 
universal properties and laws, which are not specially related to the needs 
and conditions of living beings. Thus the uses of limbs for swimming, 
crawling, walking, leaping, climbing, and flying are distinct uses, and are 
related to each other only through the general mechanical principles of 
locomotion, through which some one use, in its first exercise, may be 
incident to some other, though, in its full exercise and perfection of spe-
cial service, it is independent of the other, or has only a common depend-
ence with the other or more general conditions.  
Many mental as well as bodily powers thus have mixed natures, or 
independent uses; as, for example, the powers of the voice to call and 
allure, to warn and repel, and its uses in music and language; or the 
numerous uses of the human hand in services of strength and dexterity. 
And, on the contrary, the same uses are, in some cases, realized by inde-
pendent organs as, for example, respiration in water and in the air by gills 
and lungs, or flight by means of fins, feathers, and webs. The appearance 
of a really new power in nature (using this word in the wide meaning 
attached to it in science), the power of flight in the first birds, for 
example, is only involved potentially in previous phenomena. In the same 
way, no act of self-consciousness, however elementary, may have been 
realized before man's first self-conscious act in the animal world; yet the 
act may have been involved potentially in pre-existing powers or causes. 
(Wright 1877: 199–201) 
 
Several elements here remind of exaptation. Firstly, the very definition of the 
principle as a discontinuous modification of function, whether by phylogeny or 
ontogeny, calls for a mode of evolution consistent with the overall Darwinian 
paradigm but complementary to gradualism, thereby coming near to the 
contemporary contention that something could perform a function solely by 
means of adaptation through selection of successive and casual small variations 
in its structure. Secondly, the meaning of these incidental functional changes is 
close to Gould’s and Vrba’s adoption of G. C. Williams’ terminology, accord-
ing to whom “[f]ortuitous effects always connote a consequence following 
“accidentally” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 5), and not arising directly from construction 
by natural selection”, so that “[a]daptations have functions; exaptations have 
effects” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6). Thirdly, Wright’s insistence on the relation 
between old and new functions (merged only at the beginning, but fully 
differentiated when properly strengthened) and on latters’ progressive refine-
ment reminds of two other aspects of exaptation: one refers to Arnold’s treat-
ment and his above mentioned definition of addition exaptations (a new use is 
added to the previous and both work together in the same structure); the other 
refers to Gould and Vrba’s idea that in nature you can often see “a sequential 
set of adaptations, each converted to an exaptation of different effect that sets 
the basis for a subsequent adaptation” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 8).  
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This dynamics, just hinted at in the incipit of the article, is well captured in a 
subsequent passage, which assesses the true nature of natural selection and 
deals with the emergence of human mind: if the powers of memory, internal 
imaging and abstractive attention, useful for external perception, had been 
turned to the new function of reflective thinking (as it seems to have actually 
occurred), “the agency of natural selection would have been the same in 
preserving, and also in improving, the new faculty, provided this faculty was 
capable of improvement by degrees, and was not perfect from the first”. Indeed, 
a case of adaptation follows an exaptation. Eventually, Wright’s discussion ends 
with an open acknowledgement of the structural-functional redundancy princi-
ple, emphasizing its importance — as openly as Gould (1984; 2002) does — for 
anthropogenesis. In this respect, in a footnote to The Descent of Man (1871: 
335) Darwin himself gives Wright the credit of having stressed the importance 
of the phenomenon of multi-functionality and its relative independence from 
selective adaptation and admits his own use of the general principle in the sec-
ond chapter of the same work to explain the acquisition by man of some of his 
mental characteristics. As a matter of fact, “[m]any analogous cases could be 
advanced of organs and instincts originally adapted for one purpose, having 
been utilized for some quite distinct purpose” (Darwin 1871: 335). As already 
noted, the last edition of the Origin will then make great use of the same idea in 
the added chapter. 
Wright’s interpretation of Darwin’s theory (within an original utilitarian 
paradigm), well in advance of pragmatism and subsequent evolutionary 
epistemologies, brought out a logic of evolution extensible to the process of 
scientific development through hypotheses generation and experimental 
verification. That is, on one hand “organic or behavioral variations can be 
thought of as a kind of experimental hypotheses leaning out to the future […] 
just as, according to Wright, science hypotheses did” (Parravicini 2009/2010: 
284; my translation); on the other hand, “natural selection is a retroactive 
mechanism of validation […] the experimental “test” to verify the results, with 
which nature screens its hypotheses (Parravicini 2009/2010: 285; my transla-
tion). Extremely relevant to the development of my analysis is the contention 
that, along with mutations, also changes in behavior surge (analogically) to the 
title of hypothetical reasoning; the next step will be to show in which sense 
behavioral plasticity, abductive inference and functional shift are linked 
together. 
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2. WRIGHT AND PEIRCE ON  
PRAGMATISM AND EVOLUTION 
As a matter of fact, the concepts of exaptation and abduction historically co-
occurred together (concepts, not always the terms), but, although belonging to 
strictly related theoretical horizons, they never met in a coherent systematiza-
tion. On one hand, “it is very likely that Wright gave currency to his genial 
ideas on Darwinism within the pragmatist setting” (Parravicini 2009/2010: 8; 
my translation) and that, as a clear example of this, “Wright’s application of 
Darwin’s views to language and its role in human reasoning, as well as to the 
natural origins of “self-consciousness”, influenced both William James and 
Charles Peirce” (Wiener 1949: 54; cf. CP 2.753). On the other hand, the guess-
ing instinct considered by Peirce to be at the core of abduction is brought back 
to evolution (though not in Wright’s sense): we have a special aptitude for 
guessing right and “not man merely, but all animals derive by inheritance 
(presumably by natural selection) two classes of ideas which adapt them to their 
environment” (CP 2.753). To say, the two lines of inquiry came very close, but 
never touched. Since Wright saw an analogy between science development and 
biological evolution, one should also expect to find in the former field some-
thing analog to the principle of new functions for old structures; conversely, had 
Peirce being influenced by Wright’s ‘evolutionary epistemology’ and his idea 
of a logical-structural correspondence between inferential reasoning and organ-
isms’ historical transformations, he himself might have noticed or established a 
parallelism between the way we give birth to scientific variations and the way 
nature produces sometimes its own variations, namely by re-functionalization of 
existing powers.  
Within the semiotic tradition, Wright is not a totally unknown figure. In his 
book on the history of semiotics in the United States, Sebeok reports the content 
of a private communication with the Toronto philosopher David Savan where it 
is remarked that, thanks among others to the work of Wright, “there was a 
strong concern with signs, evidence and evidences, representation and 
representatives, and the connection of all this with action. So that Peirce’s semi-
otic is not a creatio ex nihilo but can be seen as the culmination of 120 years of 
development” (Sebeok 1991: 7). For Parravicini (2009/2010: 155) there are 
roughly three main positions as for Wright’s relationship to American philos-
ophy: for S. Ratner, Wright did found pragmatism; for others, such as G. 
Kennedy and P. P. Wiener, he simply prefigured it; eventually, for M. H. Fisch 
and E. H. Madden he influenced pragmatism, but there occur at the same time 
striking differences and developments. 
In order to examine the probability of an historical meeting between the two 
notions, my focus falls on two of them. On one hand, the choice of Madden is 
dictated by his being acknowledged as the most important scholar of Wright, 
thus specifically useful to set up properly his connection with Peirce insofar the 
birth of pragmatism is concerned. Wiener has been chosen instead for his 
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attention on the 19th century controversy on evolution, before and after 
Darwin’s revolution, and its pertinence for the development of Peirce’s thought. 
The main goal is to look for explicit influences proving or not that there already 
happened an acknowledgement of the structural similarity between processes of 
biological functional change and hypothetical inferences. 
For Madden (1953) Wright cannot be properly defined a founder of pragma-
tism, in many respects. Firstly, although he thought of scientific ideas as work-
ing hypothesis and provided a general logic of scientific procedure, he never 
went so far as to generalize the experimental method to thinking as such, that is 
“he didn’t have a general ‘theory’ of mind, meaning, or truth” (Madden 1953: 
65); on the contrary, “[p]hilosophers after Wright generalized the working 
hypothesis-criterion into the pragmatic conception of mind […] all ideas are 
working hypotheses; all thinking is experimental, and scientific experimenta-
tion, insofar as it has ideal controls, is simply a limiting case of thinking” 
(Madden 1953: 65). Besides, for the pragmatists “the mental, on all biological 
levels, functionally considered, is adaptive behavior…and consequently conti-
nuity exists between the different phylogenetic levels” (Madden 1953: 65). 
Wright did put forward a “functional-adaptive view of consciousness” 
(Parravicini 2009/2010: 394; my translation), but he never extended it to the 
mental level of scientific thought. 
Secondly, despite the tendency to take Peirce’s pragmatic maxim and its 
later versions back to Wright’s viewpoint, Madden maintains that “the element 
which Wright's meaning criterion has in common with the pragmatic principle 
is not peculiar to pragmatism and that the characteristic elements of the latter 
are not prefigured by Wright” (Madden 1953: 66). Although they had in com-
mon the principle of verification by sensuous experience, on one side Wright 
did not generalize it to simple empirical propositions: if for Peirce, for instance, 
the proposition “x is hard” is an hypothesis about further experiences, whose 
whole meaning consists of conceivable and actual practical consequences, for 
Wright instead it means that “x exhibits a certain property the meaning of which 
is provided denotatively by instances of direct sensory experiences” (Madden 
1972: 49) and hence on this point he “cannot be said to anticipate Peirce’s or 
any other pragmatic interpretation” (Madden 1972: 49). On the other side, the 
principle was not peculiar to him or pragmatism, since it was shared by other 
philosophical traditions and he just contributed to a revival. Above all, the 
greatest difference is perhaps “the pragmatist's emphasis on the manipulation 
that intervenes before verification” (Madden 1972: 68), something that cannot 
be found anywhere in Wright’s writings. 
Eventually, Madden (1956: 420) challenges the idea suggested by several 
commentators that “Wright’s concepts of ‘cosmical weather’, ‘accident’, and 
the attendant notion of irregularity […] anticipated and perhaps influenced the 
tychistic views of the younger men”, that is Peirce and James. As for irregu-
larity, if for Peirce it is due to absolute chance, an ontological reality operative 
in the cosmos (CP 6.302), on the contrary for Wright it is a function of causal 
complexity and thus just endowed with an epistemological status. The same 
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holds for accidents, “not a characteristic of events but of our knowledge of 
them; it does not mean that events are uncaused but that we do not know the 
cause” (Madden 1956: 422); in a word, “Wright believed what Peirce later 
denied” (Madden 1956: 422).  
In conclusion, it is true that for Peirce the adoption of pragmatism and its 
elaboration in a method of philosophical inquiry came from the collective 
discussions held at The Metaphysical Club of Cambridge and, among the vari-
ous members, “Chauncey Wright, something of a philosophical celebrity in 
those days, was never absent from our meetings” (CP 5.12). It is also true that 
the grounding writings of Peirce’s version of pragmatism — “The fixation of 
belief” (CP 5.358–5.387) and “How to make our ideas clear” (CP 5.286–5.302) 
— were nothing but an extended versions of a paper read at the club (CP 7.313; 
Parravicini 2009/2010: 96). Nonetheless, “Peirce and James did not seem to 
think that Wright had given them a push in the direction of what later came to 
be known as pragmatism” (Madden 1952: 29). 
In the case of evolution, three areas of comparison can be singled out: the 
epistemological status of Darwin’s theory; their different approach to 
Lamarck’s account; the issue of evolutionism as a generalization from biology 
to other fields. 
As for the first point, on one hand Peirce “could not concur with Wright in 
holding that Darwin’s theory of evolution was in line with the sensationalistic 
nominalism of Mill” (Wiener 1949: 72) and, more generally, they “did not see 
eye to eye on the significance of Darwin’s work” (Wiener 1949: 75). If Wright 
did show enthusiasm for the new theory of evolution, on the contrary Peirce 
even questioned its scientific validity (while accepting the empiric method): 
“his hypothesis […] did not appear, at first, at all near to being proved; and to a 
sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did twenty years ago” (CP 
6.297). Differently from Wright, Peirce was however able to detect the connec-
tion between Darwin’s idea of chance variations in biology and the application 
of probability theory and statistical methods to such different sciences as 
physics and sociology.  
On the other hand, if for Wiener “Wright wished to confine evolution to 
natural selection” (Wiener 1949: 63) and (less radically) did not provide explic-
itly any clear and thorough analysis of the diverse mechanisms bringing about 
the functional shift at the basis of his principle, in Peirce’s view instead 
Darwin’s hypothesis was just one of three equally operative modes of organic, 
psychological and cosmological evolution. Along with the Darwinian mode, he 
thus granted evolutionary effectiveness to cataclysmal abrupt changes and the 
inheritance of acquired traits too; and this not on the basis of empirical evi-
dence, but “on the neat ways in which they fitted into his metaphysical and 
theistic evolutionism” (Wiener 1949: 78). 
Regarding Lamarck’s theory of the transmission of acquired characters, 
“Wright was cautious enough to state his acceptance with plenty of “ifs”” 
(Wiener 1949: 60) and in his last letter to Darwin in 1875 he openly professed 
the “abandonment of the Lamarckian idea of “use” as an evolutionary factor” 
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(Wiener 1949: 60). This refusal is in line with Wright’s general stricture about 
the practice of referring in biology to such teleological ideas as beginning, 
directionality, progress and final state, among which Lamarck’s purposive 
effort of individual organisms to overcome environmental difficulties was obvi-
ously at ease. 
For Peirce was quite the opposite. Despite considering the publication of the 
Origin of Species and its demonstration of the existence of irreversible biolog-
ical transformations to be responsible of “the greatest mental awakening since 
Newton and Leibniz” (Fisch et al. 1986: 254) and granting it a great 
methodological value, only “Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general 
description of the action of love” (CP 6.300), namely with agapasm, the chief 
evolutionary mode of which “tychasm [Darwinism] and anancasm are degen-
erate forms” (CP 6.303). With respect to the theme of final causes, “[t]o say that 
the future does not influence the present is untenable doctrine. It is as much as 
to say that there are no final causes, or ends. The organic world is full of refuta-
tions of that position. Such action [by final causation] constitutes evolution” 
(CP 2.86). 
As for the third point, it must be noted that Peirce’s acceptance of alternative 
modes of biological evolution was functional “to make the broadest possible 
use of the idea of evolution, to extend it to encompass the history and logic of 
thought” (Wiener 1949: 81). If both pointed out the statistical nature of biolog-
ical laws (though on the basis of diametrically opposed conceptions about 
chance and, consequently, of radically different positions concerning their 
nominalist or realist status), Wright however “raised critical objections to the 
extension od Darwin’s theory of natural selection beyond biological and 
psychological phenomena to cosmological and theological domains” (Wiener 
1949: 9). For Wiener, Peirce didn’t adhere coherently to a key point of his own 
pragmatic maxim: if the meaning of a concept consists in the summation of its 
conceivable effects and the latters split into verifiable hypothesis and unverifi-
able metaphysical generalizations, then “in the important case of evolution, 
Wright restricted its meaning to the former class of effects, whereas Peirce was 
led into an endless labyrinth of metaphysical problems by speculating on a 
cosmic evolutionism, despite the warnings of his older friend Wright” (Wiener 
1949: 65). That is, the latter didn’t take into account at all the former’s advices 
that “it was far from established that the detailed evidence from the various 
sciences warranted any metaphysical extension of the evolutionary concept 
from the organic to the vaster inorganic world” (Wiener 1949: 63).  
Two factors prevented Wright from establishing a coincidence between 
biological evolution and scientific development: absence of full-fledged conti-
nuity between mental activity and scientific thought and partial denial of the 
capacity of living beings’ behavioral activities to shape their evolutionary paths. 
This said, an element of affinity with Peirce can anyway be acknowledged. 
Since they knew and kept in high consideration W. Whewell’s History of the 
inductive sciences (1837) and Philosophy of the inductive science (1840), both 
put in the foreground the role of hypotheses and their confirmation through 
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experimentation (Parravicini 2009/2010: 149). Besides, they acknowledged the 
imaginative and counterfactual features of scientific thinking (Parravicini 
2009/2010: 199) and Wright’s account of the explanative process—in line with 
his adherence to the postulate of universal causality, which denied the reality of 
casual or undetermined novelties — came very close to Peirce’s concept of 
abduction: for both, to explicate is to bring the unknown back to the know as 
the case of a rule (Parravicini 2009/2010: 294). This logic was applied by 
Wright to make continuous such seemingly discontinuous phenomena as the 
emergence of biological novelties, i.e. his principle of new uses for old powers 
included. In a word, he was somehow already applying abduction to exaptation 
without recognizing their intimate connection. 
Most of all, Wright’s view on scientific hypotheses was not only consistent 
with Peirce’s analysis of abductive reasoning — creative, but nonetheless 
inferential and thus linked to the past — but all the same he insisted on their 
perceptive side. For the latter, “all knowledge without exception comes from 
observation” (MS CSP L75 C, 1902, 91–92; quoted from Stjernfelt 2007: xiii) 
and that is particularly true of abduction; for the former, while maintaining that 
the natural philosopher must educate himself in the way empirical sciences 
“make knowledge profitable in the ascertainment of new truths”, their utility 
depends “on their capacity to enlarge our experience by bringing to notice 
residual phenomena, and making us observe what we have entirely overlooked, 
or search out what has eluded our observation. […] They are rather the eyes 
with which nature is seen” (Wright 1877: 55; emphases mine). Later on, it will 
be clear that, as for processes of re-functionalization, this is more than a 
metaphor. 
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3. PEIRCE’S EVOLUTIONISM: THE ROLE OF  
CONTINUITY AND ICONIC ABDUCTION  
Whatever the historical truth — whether Wright founded, prefigured or influ-
enced the nascent pragmatism (and Peirce), or whether it came out spontane-
ously from the sharing of ideas developed in collective discussions — it is for 
sure that in Peirce’s writings no direct reference to Wright’s principle of redun-
dancy between structures and functions can be found. Two favorable opportuni-
ties had however occurred. Firstly, if for Wiener Peirce’s belief of a correspond-
ence between history of science and natural evolution grew up “probably under 
the influence of the evolutionary conception of consciousness which Wright had 
elaborated in his “psycho-zoology” or “Evolution of Self-Consciousness”” 
(Wiener 1949: 80), then he did get in touch with the principle of new uses for 
old powers, without considering it enough important to be integrated in his later 
evolutionary cosmology, even as a corrective to strict Darwinism. Secondly, 
“it’s very likely that, as suggested by Max Fisch, all members of the “Meta-
physical Club” read Wright’s work on the Limits of natural selection” 
(Parravicini 2009/2010: 356) and the same principle appears here as well. To 
sum, Peirce did come in touch at least twice with the core idea of what would 
have been developed under the concepts of preadaptation or exaptation and 
went beyond, not granting it enough theoretical weight. 
Exaptation and abduction never met. Neither in Wright, with his analogy 
between biological evolution and scientific development, not meant to be a 
genealogical isomorphism (novel natural traits and scientific hypothesis do 
occur by means of similar and evolutionary linked processes); nor in Peirce, 
with his genealogical isomorphism (for instance, the three forms of inference — 
abduction, induction, deduction — are scientific, psychological and biological 
modalities of development, with no solution of continuity), but neglecting at the 
same time Wright’s suggestion of a specific mechanism of production of varia-
tions consistent with Darwinism. 
A major problem arises: how can exaptation and abduction be integrated if 
the latter has been organically included in a cosmology where the chief evolu-
tionary role is played by Lamarckism, while the former places itself as a com-
peting proposal within a paradigm that, by being defined “post-Darwinian” 
(Favareau 2010: 436; Hoffmeyer 2008; Kull 1999), is not against Darwin’s 
work, but definitely does not accept Lamarck’s solution? Two questions need 
therefore then to be answered: was Peirce’s position really anti-Darwinian? 
What did it actually mean for him to support a Lamarckian viewpoint?  
As for the nature of Peirce’s attacks towards Darwinism, it has been noticed 
by P. Skagestad that he was the first thinker who seriously tackled the issue of 
“how come evolution through natural selection has produced a new and differ-
ent mode of evolution which does not operate through natural selection?” 
(Skagestad 1979: 88). Although he regarded Darwin’s theory as a matter of 
logic and pointed out “an aspect which Darwin himself tried to conceal in 
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embarrassment, namely the employment of chance as a mode of explanation” 
(Skagestad 1979: 90), he did not consider it sufficient. 
On one hand, quite a number of Peirce’s remarks were made “in the context 
of discussions of the origin and growth of intellectual activities in general, and 
of science in particular” (Skagestad 1979: 91). Someway close to Wright’s 
description of the evolutionary origin of our conceptual distinctions between 
mind and world, subject and object, and so forth, he conferred on such 
“rudimentary world-view” ideas as force and matter an adaptive value because 
of their development in the human mind through the action of natural selection 
(Skagestad 1979: 91–93; see also CP 5.591). 
On the other hand, he denied “that natural selection can play any significant 
role in the internal development of science” (Skagestad 1979: 94), for three 
reasons: firstly, science also progresses by means of intentional modifications 
of old theories to make them fit newly observed facts and great conceptual 
revolutions (that is, biologically speaking, via Lamarckism and cataclysmic 
events); secondly, the relative exactitude on the long run of scientific hypoth-
eses is in contrast with the adaptations of nature, which for Peirce “are never 
found to be quite perfect” (CP 6.50); thirdly, “pure science has nothing at all to 
do with action…nothing is vital for science” and the scientist, as for his conclu-
sions, “risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon 
as experience opposes them” (CP 1.635) — scientific hypotheses are not 
beliefs, because “we believe the proposition we are ready to act upon” (CP 
1.635), and therefore science is not a tool for action. 
Since Peirce was “warning against the threat to scientific progress of placing 
science under externally imposed social and political goals” and “arguing 
against the intrusion of provisional and tentative scientific conclusions […] into 
practical affairs, such as those of religion” (Skagestad 1979: 101), it is possible 
“to interpret his criticisms of Darwin’s theory as really part of a polemic against 
the “Darwinian” instrumentalists of his time” (Skagestad 1979: 102). Besides, 
because of the theory of synechism, Peirce approached evolution according to 
his logic of scientific development and method. This is consistent with several 
statements by Wiener: “[t]he historical order of Peirce’s writings […] shows 
plainly that traditional metaphysical and logical problems and ways of thinking 
[…] antedated his evolutionism” (Wiener 1949: 79; emphasis mine); “in order 
to make the broadest possible use of the idea of evolution, to extend it to encom-
pass the history and logic of thought…Peirce enlarged the idea of evolution” 
(Wiener 1949: 81; emphasis mine) to include Lamarck’s theory and cataclysmic 
changes; “Peirce regarded Darwin’s “chance variations” as illustrating his meta-
physical category of Firstness […] Darwin’s “struggle for existence” as illus-
trating Secondness […] the quasi-teleological idea of natural selection by sur-
vival of the fittest and the Lamarckian reproduction of adaptive characters, 
illustrate Thirdness” (Wiener 1949: 85). 
Given this clarification, it is thus possible to fully agree with Wiener’s asser-
tion that Peirce’s Lamarckism was not based on biological evidence. At the 
same time, Skagestad’s conclusions on his anti-Darwinism are consistent with 
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the present topic. If Peirce’s problem was to bring together the necessity to 
apply biological evolution to cultural and scientific development on one hand 
and the uselessness of science (in the short run) on the other hand, “[w]hat still 
needs explaining, therefore, is how evolution through natural selection can have 
given rise to a different mode of evolution, not acting through natural selection” 
(Skagestad 1979: 109). For Peirce, “[i]n the lower stages of his mental activity, 
man…evolves through organic adaptation…; in the higher stages, he evolves 
through a process where each individual step may be counter-adaptive” 
(Skagestad 1979: 109). While elaborating on the article “The Fixation of 
Belief” and dealing with the similar dilemma of how the method of science 
could have evolved and picked up by natural selection despite its nature, 
Skagestad’s answer is the following: 
 
what Peirce is saying is that rationality is ‘pleiotropic’ — i.e. it comes in 
a package-deal, like the gene which protects against malaria, but causes 
sickle-cell anemia. The evolution of rationality is itself an adaptive step 
in the process of developing fixed belief; but, once rationality has 
evolved, it may act through counter-adaptive intermediate steps, thereby 
generating its own, novel mode of evolution. Hence one may consistently 
view science as an animal activity, which has originated from, and is 
maintained by, natural selection, but whose internal growth is yet gov-
erned by its own, non-natural mechanisms of variation and selection. 
[…] Peirce in fact anticipated questions which are still in the fore of 
the discussion, and proposed answers which are at least not outdated by 
the subsequent progress of biology. His arguments remain a powerful 
challenge to the recent trends of sociobiology and evolutionary episte-
mology. (Skagestad 1979: 112; my emphases) 
 
However strong and binding such an interpretation might be, a further issue 
calls for clarification: was Peirce a true follower of Lamarck? Did he really 
support the theory of inheritance of acquired characters? These are some claims 
of his:  
 
The changes have not been fortuitous but wholly the result of strivings of 
the individuals (CP 1.104) 
 
The Lamarckian theory also supposes that the development of species has 
taken place by a long series of insensible changes, but it supposes that 
those changes have taken place during the lives of the individuals, in 
consequence of effort and exercise, and that reproduction plays no part in 
the process except in preserving these modifications. Thus, the 
Lamarckian theory only explains the development of characters for which 
individuals strive, while the Darwinian theory only explains the produc-
tion of characters really beneficial to the race, though these may be fatal 
to individuals. But more broadly and philosophically conceived, 
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Darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance, and the 
destruction of bad results, while Lamarckian evolution is evolution by the 
effect of habit and effort. (CP 6.16) 
 
A third method, which supersedes their strife, lies enwrapped in the the-
ory of Lamarck. According to his view, all that distinguishes the highest 
organic forms from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little 
hypertrophies or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their 
lives, and have been transmitted to their offspring. Such a transmission of 
acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking, and this is the 
representative and derivative within the physiological domain of the law 
of mind […] The Lamarckians further suppose that, although some of the 
modifications of form so transmitted were originally due to mechanical 
causes, yet the chief factors of their first production were the straining of 
endeavor and the overgrowth superinduced by exercise, together with the 
opposite actions (CP 6.299) 
 
Lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit […] Now it 
is energetic projaculation (lucky there is such a word, or this untried hand 
might have been put to inventing one) by which in the typical instances 
of Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. 
Habit, however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the 
structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, gradu-
ally replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, habit plays 
a double part; it serves to establish the new features, and also to bring 
them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the ani-
mals and plants to which they belong (CP 6.300) 
 
Despite such Lamarckian profession of faith, it has been argued (Pietarinen 
2012: 76) that Peirce’s “evolution by creative love” may be close to the so-
called Baldwin effect (which is consistent with Pievani’s third type of exapta-
tion); therefore, there might be a basis on which to attempt to frame evolution-
ary functional shifts within a Peircean paradigm. Besides, this reading goes as 
far as to conjecture that Baldwin’s ideas — “ontogenetic adaptations are really 
new, not performed; and they are really reproduced in succeeding generations, 
although not physically inherited” (Pietarinen 2012: 77) — could have been 
influenced by Peirce’s 1893 Monist article “Evolutionary Love”. Pietarinen’s 
proposal stands on the assumption that, had Peirce explicitly spoken of contex-
tual changes, liable to be equated in a way to behavioral lifetime constructions 
of new ecological niches, he would have predated and influenced that simulated 
form of Lamarckism which Baldwinian evolution is. However, this can not be 
inferred from the previous excerpt: firstly, “energetic projaculation” does not 
indicate a way of transmission, but rather a cause of transformation; secondly, 
changes are always ascribed to “forms”, which seem to suggest organs rather 
then contexts. The only possible clue still remaining is that habit, “in the form 
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of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sus-
tains them” (CP 6.300; emphasis mine)—too little to build on a speculative 
interpretation. 
In order to understand how Peirce’s Lamarckism truly works — and to 
reveal it in a theoretical form compatible with the current modeling project—
attention must be paid to two articles: “Evolutionary Love” (from which some 
of the definitions above mentioned are taken), and “The Law of Mind”. In the 
first one, via assimilation to the action of love, it is characterized (not only 
analogically, but literally) as mind-like, thus intentional or goal directed and 
regarding the development of ideas (rules of action or habits); ultimately, it 
identifies with learning: Lamarckian evolution, by being induced by individual 
efforts, derives from psychological laws and “growth by exercise takes place 
also in the mind. Indeed, that is what it is to learn [...]. Patient attention will be 
able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning” (CP 6.301). 
Given the overlap between beliefs or ideas and habits, there is a problem of 
interpretation: does Peirce’s Lamarckism concern primarily the acquisition of 
new pragmatic rules or their expansion through new applications? This is 
important to be clarified, especially when it will come to abduction, which has 
been articulated by scholars in several subspecies and whose implication as a 
modeling device is not that simple at first. Peirce is ambiguous thereupon. On 
one hand, the love-driven development of thought consists in the “adoption of 
certain mental tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite 
blindly by the mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by 
an immediate attraction for the idea itself” (CP 6.307; emphasis mine). This 
seems to imply the adoption of something new altogether. On the other hand, 
other expressions are pointing in a different direction: “The agapastic develop-
ment of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its purposive character, 
this purpose being the development of an idea” (CP 6.315; emphasis mine). 
Besides, the previous excerpts regarding Peirce’s definitions do not tell pre-
cisely whether the habit establishing new features has been constructed ex-novo 
or not. At least in “Evolutionary Love”, the concept of development does not 
seem to focus much on the internal or cognitive process of extending one’s own 
ideas, but rather on the way they are communicated and apprehended within a 
community or by single individuals; that is, development means in this case 
“extension” or “diffusion” and conflates partially with the meaning of “adop-
tion”. 
A complementary understanding gets in if one turns to the second article, in 
this following the indications of the author himself: “endeavor, since it is 
directed toward an end, is essentially psychical, even though it be sometimes 
unconscious; and the growth due to exercise, as I argued in my last paper, fol-
lows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechanics” (CP 6.299). Given 
that ideas spread through continuity among people, they develop in the same 
way inside each single mind too and this is the only way to create a sound 
analogy between the “agapastic development of thought” and natural evolution, 
unless admitting that organisms do transmit each other habits during their 
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lifetime (impossible for those lower forms devoid of any ability to change 
behavior by imitation). In such cases, how does an idea gain its power to 
become effective? In Peirce’s words, “[h]abit is that specialization of the law of 
mind whereby a general idea gains the power of exciting reactions. But in order 
that the general idea should attain all its functionality, it is necessary, also, that 
it should become suggestible by sensations. That is accomplished by a psychical 
process having the form of hypothetic inference” (CP 6.145). Thus, within the 
realm of biology, Lamarckian evolution does not represent neither deduction, 
where the mind is already under the dominion of a prior general rule of action, 
nor induction, through which a habit becomes established or corroborated, but 
abduction.  
It must be noticed that elsewhere Peirce denies the connection between 
Lamarckism and abduction, which is typical of scientific discoveries: the for-
mer “is not the way in which science mainly progresses. It advances by leaps; 
and the impulse for each leap is either some new observational resource, or 
some novel way of reasoning about the observations […] it draws attention to 
relations between facts which would previously have been passed by unper-
ceived” (CP 1.109); as for new theories, “we see new ideas connected with new 
observational methods […] It is not by insensible steps” (CP 1.109). However, 
firstly the contrast regards more the effects (radical novelties against gradual 
changes) than other aspects, such as for example the internal logic ruling both 
processes; secondly, precisely this logic is isomorphic: on one side, for a habit 
to be taken or become functional, it must be connected to sensations previously 
unable to trigger its rule of action; on the other side, hypotheses are built on the 
basis of new or hitherto unexplained facts which become accountable by 
existing theories. Eventually, such setting accommodates Peirce’s description of 
the action of love too: “Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, 
gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely” (CP 6.289). 
For the continuity between these two processes to be fully realized, one has 
to recognize the physiological meaning of the concept of inference or reasoning, 
according to Peirce’s famous example of the frog. Given that the cognition of 
rules needs not to be conscious and cases, results and rules correspond respec-
tively to sensations, volitions or decisions to act and habit or rules of action, 
then the following: 
 
a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a 
decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, 
whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is 
the physiological analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the 
ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form 
of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically 
considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the effer-
ent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a 
volition, and logically the inference of a result (CP 2.711). 
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Peirce produces a neat physiological translation of deduction (which proceeds 
from rule and case to result): “a general idea suggests in each case a corre-
sponding reaction. But a certain sensation is seen to involve that idea. Conse-
quently, that sensation is followed by that reaction. That is the way the hind legs 
of a frog, separated from the rest of the body, reason, when you pinch them” 
(CP 6.144). At the same time, it is not difficult to conceive the formation pro-
cess of such a connection, accomplished through induction (which proceeds 
from case and result to rule): after several repetitions of a specific detrimental 
event, which is perceived by the frog’s body, and the following of a specific 
action or movement of relief or clearing, able to cope successfully with the 
situation, the succession becomes established as invariant from that moment 
onwards. But how is abduction (which proceeds from rule and result to case) to 
be understood from a physiological perspective? 
Some clues come from Peirce’s statement that hypothetical inference “is the 
formula of the acquirement of secondary sensation — a process by which a 
confused concatenation of predicates is brought into order under a synthetizing 
predicate” (CP 2.712). Moreover, an idea attains proper functionality by 
becoming suggestible by sensations and this equates to induction from qualities: 
 
For example, I know that the kind of man known and classed as a "mug-
wump" has certain characteristics. He has a high self-respect and places 
great value upon social distinction. He laments the great part that row-
dyism and unrefined good fellowship play in the dealings of American 
politicians with their constituency. He thinks that the reform which would 
follow from the abandonment of the system by which the distribution of 
offices is made to strengthen party organizations and a return to the origi-
nal and essential conception of office-filling would be found an unmixed 
good. He holds that monetary considerations should usually be the deci-
sive ones in questions of public policy. He respects the principle of 
individualism and of laissez-faire as the greatest agency of civilization. 
These views, among others, I know to be obtrusive marks of a "mug-
wump." Now, suppose I casually meet a man in a railway train, and fall-
ing into conversation find that he holds opinions of this sort; I am natu-
rally led to suppose that he is a "mugwump." That is hypothetic infer-
ence. That is to say, a number of readily verifiable marks of a mugwump 
being selected, I find this man has these, and infer that he has all the 
other characters which go to make a thinker of that stripe. (CP 6.145; 
emphases mine) 
 
Here it becomes clear one of the meanings of the concept of knowledge, namely 
knowing as re-cognizing something unfamiliar as familiar. This is almost tauto-
logical and, in fact, the innovative power of abduction does not come from its 
logical form, but rather from an act of “creative perception” (Stjernfelt 2007: 
331–332). What is perceived exactly? For Peirce, “[t]he mode of suggestion by 
which, in abduction, the facts suggest the hypothesis is by resemblance…the 
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resemblance of the facts to the consequences of the hypothesis” (CP 7.218; 
emphasis mine). This stands out in another example quite similar:  
 
Suppose, then, that, being seated in a street car, I remark a man opposite 
to me whose appearance and behavior unite characters which I am sur-
prised to find together in the same person. I ask myself, How can this be? 
Suppose I find this problematic reply: Perhaps he is an ex-priest. He is 
the very image of such a person; he presents an icon of an ex-priest. Here 
is an iconic argument, or abduction of it (quoted from Stjernfelt 2007: 
340; emphases mine). 
 
Elsewhere, Peirce reiterates the same: “Hypothesis is […] where we find that in 
certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance, and infer that they 
resemble one another strongly in other respects” (CP 2.624). Since Peirce thinks 
of icons as signs “whose significant character which causes them to be so inter-
preted is their possessing a quality, in consequence of which they may be taken 
as representative of anything that may happen to exists that has that quality” 
(Peirce 1903; MS [R] 462: 86; emphases mine), then both mental experiments 
display situations where present qualities of persons or objects are resembling 
those (and recalling others) which have already been collected under a common 
typifying label, thereby suggesting a possible categorization to be applied in the 
new context too. Back to the frog example, if its sensory apparatus came into 
contact for instance with a substance presenting some degree of similarity to 
those stimuli (or inducing corresponding sensations) which became associated 
with specific reactions in the first place, and if an identical action were elicited, 
then as a matter of fact the organism as a whole would produce an abduction. In 
this way, the frog’s ability to remove from skin sources of irritation (result or 
action) and the general connection of this behavior (rule or habit) to specific 
past stimulations should become able to be applied to new or additional sensa-
tions (cases).  
This apply both to multiple and single facts: “abduction is often presented as 
if the surprising phenomenon is only a single fact […] but a better picture is 
provided by emphasizing a constellation of facts or characteristics” (Paavola 
2011: 307), which are brought back to unity through its synthetizing activity. 
On one hand, “[a] mass of facts is before us” and “they seem to be so multiplex 
intricate that we can neither satisfy ourselves that what we have set down repre-
sents the facts [...]. But suddenly […] it occurs to us that if we were to assume 
something to be true that we do not know to be true, these facts would arrange 
themselves luminously. That is abduction” (Peirce 1998; EPII 531). Previously 
unrelated events are gathered together under a common conceptual umbrella, 
thereby turning them all into cases of the same rule. On the other hand, with an 
eye on the single phenomenon to be explained, Peirce logically formalizes 
abduction as follows: “The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C 
would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true” 
(CP 5.189). Behaviorally understood: something happens and is perceived 
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(fact); if a particular habit were chosen, the fact would become recognized as an 
instance (case) of that rule of behavior and dealt with properly; so, the habit 
(rule) is selected. But most of all, either instances rely on iconicity, as for 
instance the example referred in philosophy of science of Ignaz Semmelweis’ 
discovery of the cause of childbed fever shows: the solution came “when he 
noticed that the symptoms caused by blood poisoning are similar to symptoms 
of the childbed fever, and he made a hypothesis on the basis of this […]. By 
recognizing this similarity, Semmelweis used an iconic relationship, and con-
cluded that there are good reasons to think that the cause might be similar in 
these two cases” (Paavola 2011: 306–307). 
For iconicity to be operative and interpretation to occur, similarities need to 
be perceived. Now, for Peirce perceptual judgments themselves involve abduc-
tion: “abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp 
line of demarcation between them; or, in other words, our first premisses, the 
perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive infer-
ences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism” (CP 5.181). 
What links perceptions to hypothetical inference is their interpretative nature, 
that is the fact they entail possible general modes of different categorization of 
identical stimuli: in other words, the same thing, considered as a single token, 
can be said to belong to more than one type and, in unusual or problematic 
contexts, the decision compares to a guess. By defining something as the token 
of a type, perception performs the same classification process through which in 
scientific or common reasoning a fact is turned into the case of a rule. The logi-
cal formula turns therefore openly in a physiological sequence (CP 8.64):  
 
A well-recognized kind of object, M, has for its ordinary predicates P[1], 
P[2], P[3], etc., indistinctly recognized. 
The suggesting object, S, has these same predicates, P[1], P[2], P[3], etc.  
Hence, S is of the kind M. 
 
By all means, perception and abduction differ in some respect and the parallel 
involves problems. As for the former, percepts themselves need to be distin-
guished from their propositional expression, that is perceptual judgments 
(although either are constructed from the same sensorial qualities), and both are 
“absolutely forced upon my acceptance, and that by a process which I am 
utterly unable to control and consequently am unable to criticize” (CP 5.157). 
As for the latter, along with being critical to knowledge growth through con-
scious self-criticism, it splits into several subtypes (Hoffmann 2010; Bonfantini 
2003) that have no equivalent at the physiological level. This said, it equally 
holds true that “[i]n perception, the conclusion has the peculiarity of not being 
abstractly thought, but actually seen, so that it is not exactly a judgment, though 
it is tantamount to one” (CP 8.65; emphasis mine). Besides, inference does not 
coincide with consciousness and self-control, so “[i]f we were to subject this 
subconscious process to logical analysis, we should find that it terminated in what 
that analysis would represent as an abductive inference” (CP 5.181). Eventually: 
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It seems to be clear, however, that we hardly create anything “new” in 
perceiving something, although we could say that we are “forming an 
explanatory hypothesis” with regard to what is in front of our eyes. Thus, 
if perception is accepted as a form of abduction, we need to make a 
distinction between creating an “explanatory hypothesis” and selecting 
one from a given database. For example, when reading a word, the word 
we read is a hypothesis that “explains” a perceived sequence of letters. In 
this case, we are selecting an explanatory hypothesis from the set of 
words we already know without creating a new one; we associate a cer-
tain sequence of letters with a hypothesis that exists already in our mind 
(Hoffmann 2010). 
 
To sum up the issue about Peirce’s evolutionism, Lamarckian habit taking 
implicitly takes the form of abductive inference and involves the selection of a 
pre-existing rule of action and its application to novel sensory or perceptive 
stimuli, through their iconic similarity to previous experiences. This is not 
restricted to vision, for “an icon is a pure image, not necessarily visual” (Peirce 
1902: 41–43), and whenever it takes place, given proper favorable circum-
stances, morphological changes can be triggered and made effective in the long 
run. Thus conceived, biological evolution is mirrored by scientific progress, the 
abrupt character of the latter aside.  
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4. ABDUCTION AND EXAPTATION 
It is often overlooked the fact that Peirce himself provided a solution able to 
turn his Lamarckism in true, so to speak, “Baldwinism”, not to say in out-and-
out “Gouldism”. Along with casual variations and the transmission of inherited 
characters, there is in fact a third mode of evolution, “cataclysmal evolution”, 
and in biological history the different modalities are anything but mutually 
exclusive — “it seems altogether probable that all three of these modes of 
evolution have acted” (CP 1.105) — and cooperate in the construction of new 
living forms. Specifically:  
 
species […] are rapidly altered after cataclysms or rapid geological 
changes. Under novel circumstances, we often see animals and plants 
sporting excessively in reproduction, and sometimes even undergoing 
transformations during individual life, phenomena no doubt due partly to 
the enfeeblement of vitality from the breaking up of habitual modes of 
life, partly to changed food, partly to direct specific influence of the 
element in which the organism is immersed. If evolution has been 
brought about in this way, not only have its single steps not been insen-
sible, as both Darwinians and Lamarckians suppose, but they are further-
more neither haphazard on the one hand, nor yet determined by an inward 
striving on the other, but on the contrary are effects of the changed 
environment, and have a positive general tendency to adapt the organism 
to that environment, since variation will particularly affect organs at once 
enfeebled and stimulated. (CP 6.17) 
 
the theory of cataclysmal evolution, according to which the changes have 
not been small and have not been fortuitous; but they have taken place 
chiefly in reproduction. According to this view, sudden changes of the 
environment have taken place from time to time. These changes have put 
certain organs at a disadvantage, and there has been an effort to use them 
in new ways. Such organs are particularly apt to sport in reproduction and 
to change in the way which adapts them better to their recent mode of 
exercise. (CP 1.104; emphases mine) 
 
The surprising aspect of these excerpts lies in the fact that, together with what 
said thus far and by taking into account that “tychasm [evolution by chance or 
Darwinism] and anancasm [evolution by mechanical necessity or cataclysmal 
evolution] are degenerate forms of agapasm [which therefore combine them 
all]” (CP 6.303), there are all the ingredients to claim that, however unwittingly 
and not in the same terms, Peirce did suggest an evolutionary scenario combin-
ing abduction and exaptation. Some behavioral choices during the lifetime of 
an organism, which firstly are based on purely sensory-perceptive mechanisms 
of recognition of similarities among previously unrelated objects (now to be 
pragmatically categorized under the same habit or rule of action, hypothetically 
33 
applied as for its subsequent success) and secondly determine significant 
transformations in its ecological relations (to the extent that it can be said that 
now the environment is in some respect substantially different from the pre-
vious one), induce functional changes in the usage of existing organs (exapta-
tion) and, over generations, their refinement through genes-driven (natural 
selection and adaptation) progressive small modifications. 
Such reading fits at the same time Peirce’s “extended fallibilism”, the idea 
that knowledge is always tentative and subject to revision, in all its forms. 
Throughout, it proceeds by means of hypotheses, which are either constructed 
anew or suggested before inexplicable facts (abduction), but always experimen-
tally developed in their consequences (deduction) and then tested (induction). 
Natural history follows the same pattern. In Stjernfelt’s words, “the Ab-De-In 
cycle has its naturalist counterpart in the trial-and-error of Uexküllian functional 
circles and maybe even — so Peirce — in process of evolution: variation 
(abduction), species consequences of variation (deduction), and natural selec-
tion (induction)” (Stjernfelt 2007: 342). 
However important this structural correspondence, the critical component of 
the analogy (or better, of the continuity) between biological evolution and 
scientific progress — what actually represents the theoretical key to the detec-
tion of a case study and sets out the conditions for an experimental proposal — 
is another. Once again, Peirce provides the decisive clue: “There is no greater 
nor more frequent mistake in practical logic than to suppose that things which 
resemble one another strongly in some respects are any the more likely for that 
to be alike in others (CP 2.634)”. Namely, abduction can be deceptive and lead 
to wrong conclusions. From a logical point of view, it is a fallacy that goes by 
the name of affirming the consequent. To understand how it is possible for a 
living organism to make a perceptive mistake, attention must be focused on a 
central feature of iconicity, that is substitutability: “An Icon is a Representamen 
whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that 
it has qua thing renders it fit to be a representamen. Thus, anything is fit to be a 
Substitute for anything that it is like” (CP 2.276). What looks like a weakness at 
first — icons have been subjected to severe criticism against their motivated 
status, for anything can be said to resemble anything else and actual interpreta-
tion needs necessarily conventionalization — turns out to be a strength too, 
since ambiguity makes them creative: exactly because they embody indeterm-
inateness and possibility and can represent whatever object possessing their 
quality, our knowledge can be extended and learning itself, by growing through 
novel applications to different but analogous cases of preexisting concepts or 
ideas, can occur. As Stjernfelt (2007: 28) puts it, “an icon potentially refers to 
an indefinite class of objects, namely all those objects which have, in some 
respect, a relation of similarity to it”; we never observe just singular things, 
since “already in ordinary perception, generality and continuity play a central 
role — e.g. in our spontaneous recognition that this or that aspect of perception 
is an instantiation of some general type or process” (Stjernfelt 2007: 9). 
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It must be noticed that the idea of similarity as commutability was already 
present in the work of Jakob von Uexküll (1982): 
 
We know from Sarris's experiments that a dog trained to the command 
'chair' learns to sit on a chair, and will be on the look-out for other seat-
ing-accommodations if the chair is removed; indeed, he searches for 
canine sitting-accommodations, which need in no way be suitable for 
human use. The various sitting-accommodations all have the same 
'sitting-quality' (Sitz-Ton)', they are meaning-carriers for sitting because 
they can be exchanged with each other at will, and the dog will make use 
of them indiscriminately upon hearing the command 'chair'. (Uexküll 
1982: 28–29; emphases mine) 
 
The deaf and blind tick is solely constituted to make every mammal in its 
Umwelt appear as the same meaning-carrier […]. For the tick, the mean-
ing-carrier has only one smell, which comes from the sweat common to 
all mammals. That meaning-carrier is also tangible and warm, and allows 
itself to be bored into and to have blood extracted from it. In this way it is 
possible to reduce all mammals — no matter how greatly they differ in 
shape, color, sound, and smell in our Umwelt — to a common denomi-
nator. On approach, the properties of any mammal — be it a human, a 
dog, a deer, or a mouse — contrapuntally activate the life-rule of the tick 
(Uexküll 1982: 57; emphases mine). 
 
In this case, an error would consist in treating like a mammal an organism that 
does emanate an odor identical or close to butyric acid, but without actually 
being that kind of living being. Here it is the corresponding translation in a 
wrong hypothetical inference or abduction: due to past phylogenetic experience, 
a fact or result (sensory detection of a specific biochemical volatile element) is 
automatically categorized as something functional to the organism’s inner 
metabolism and thus turned via sensory abduction into the case (mammal) of a 
rule (if mammal, then butyric acid); immediately, the following deductive phase 
is triggered, where the case (mammal) becomes now an instance of a second 
rule (if mammal, then plopping), whose result is to be tested through induction 
by the actual finding of a warm-blood animal, which fails. Perhaps, the wrong 
sensory inference can be better appreciated in the case of electric traps for 
mosquitoes: by emitting carbon dioxide, they attract insects and kill them with 
electrification. By categorizing this compound as the property of something 
from which nutritive blood with high protein content can be sucked out, 
mosquitoes condemn themselves to death, since in a world far beyond their 
general cognitive abilities the equation between carbon dioxide and exploitable 
food is not necessary. In their case, an inferential mistake starts an automatic 
response whose verification proves to be fatal. 
Needless to say that such articulation of the sensory phase is purely 
epistemological and does not belong to the immediacy characterizing insects’ 
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simple neural systems. But it is true that, if reflexes or automatic response 
behaviors are the physiological equivalent of deduction — “a syllogism in 
Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog” — 
and they are by force preceded by a step of sensorial recognition, reasons of 
information economy on one side and the generality and continuity of chemical-
physical laws and their perception on the other side make them inferential. That 
is to say, an abduction lies at the very core of every deduction. The difficulty to 
acknowledge this point rests mainly on the simple and univocal nature of the 
recognition processes just mentioned: with higher nervous systems able to con-
struct complex and multi-sensorial representations of objects (able thus to 
experience percepts and not just isolated sensations), Peirce’s induction of 
qualities becomes evident (by recognizing a single sensorial component, the 
remaining elements are inferred and the object as a whole is postulated); 
contrariwise, in the multiphase chains characterizing the feeding behaviors of 
ticks and mosquitoes, at every step each single sensation or quality defines a 
complete object, or better it coincides with the class of all objects possessing it 
(according to Peirce’s claims on the generality and continuity of icons) and 
errors are inevitably behind the corner (since not all objects exhibiting a single 
quality have others too). 
That iconic relations based on some type of similarity can lead to mistaken 
substitutions is well exemplified by Stjernfelt’s views on categorical perception. 
In his discussion on bacterial chemotaxis, he states the following: 
 
Here, the signals are based on categorical perception — a perception 
which immediately categorizes the entity perceived and thus remains 
blind to internal differences within the category […]. This has, however, 
huge semiotic implications, for this entails that E. coli — exactly like us 
— maybe fooled by artificial sweeteners bearing the same ‘active site’ on 
their outer perimeter, even if being completely different chemicals […]. 
E. coli has the ability to categorize a series of sugars — but, by the same 
token, the economy involved in judging objects from their surface only 
has an unavoidable flip side: it involves the possibility of mistake, of 
being fooled by allowing impostors in your categorization (Stjernfelt 
2007: 207–209; emphases mine) 
 
Since the bacterium cannot discriminate between edible glucose and irrelevant 
saccharine,” the two substances are categorized together due to a morphological 
similarity between the ‘active sites’ on the macromolecules’ outside as per-
ceived by the bacteria” (Stjernfelt 2007: 212). In addition, for the more complex 
the organism, the subtler its perceptual granularity and hence greater its ability 
of inter-categorical discrimination, one might conjecture that living beings with 
simple sensory systems should possess, under specific circumstances, higher 
rates of speciation, due to their easier tendency to make mistakes. This idea 
could also be condensed in a complementary maxim to the definition of iconic-
ity in terms of generality and continuity: all sweet things, by being sweet, are 
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the same thing. Misleading indeed, but such proneness to error might be the key 
factor playing an important role in some evolutionary scenarios, as the case 
study will attempt to show. 
Terrence Deacon (1997), in his account of iconic relations, provides a clear 
idea about their intimate connection to fallacious discriminative processes: 
 
Consider camouflage, as in the case of natural protective coloration. A 
moth on a tree whose wings resemble the graininess and color of the 
bark, though not perfectly, can still escape being eaten by a bird if the 
bird is inattentive and interprets the moth's wings as just more tree […]. 
Some features of the moth's wings were iconic of the bark, irrespective of 
their degree of similarity, merely because under some interpretation (an 
inattentive bird) they were not distinguished from it […]. What makes the 
moth wings iconic is an interpretive process produced by the bird, not 
something about the moth's wings. Their coloration was taken to be an 
icon because of something that the bird didn't do. What the bird was 
doing was actively scanning bark, its brain seeing just more of the same 
(bark, bark, bark…). What it didn't do was alter this process (e.g., bark, 
bark, not-bark, bark…). It applied the same interpretive perceptual pro-
cess to the moth as it did to the bark. It didn't distinguish between them, 
and so confused them with one another. This established the iconic 
relationship between moth and bark. Iconic reference is the default […]. 
Iconism is where the referential buck stops when nothing more is added. 
And at some level, due either to limitations in abilities to produce distin-
guishing responses or simply a lack of effort to produce them, the 
production of new interpretants stops. Whether because of boredom or 
limitations of a minimal nervous system, there are times when almost 
anything can be iconic of anything else (stuff, stuff, stuff…) (Deacon 
1997: 75–76) 
 
In summary, the interpretive process that generates iconic reference is 
none other than what in other terms we call recognition (mostly percep-
tual recognition, but not necessarily). Breaking down the term re-cogni-
tion says it all: to "think [about something] again." (Deacon 1997: 76) 
 
Thus, by re-cognizing something as something that in fact it is not on the basis 
of sensory and perceptual clues implying some degree of similarity, the bird — 
just as ticks and bacteria — performs a wrong abduction.  
The connection between erroneous interpretative perceptions and differential 
biological consequences represents the pivot around which the second article 
(Weible 2012a) has developed its argument. It must be remembered that, what-
ever the particular expression employed — new uses of old powers; change, 
extension, intensification or substitution of function; multi-functionality; 
preadaptation; exaptation — a common element in many authors is the 
acknowledgment of the key role of living beings’ activities (and not just of 
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genetic chance) in determining their evolutionary paths (for instance through 
the selection and construction of new ecological niches, thereby triggering 
either generalizations or innovations in the exploitation of specific traits). With 
a view to modeling, the connection between behavioral plasticity and functional 
shift did not pose any major problems; but now that the last section has shown 
how organisms’ agency can be framed to match with humans’ hypothetical 
reasoning, the main difficulty turns out to be the discovery of sensory-driven 
changes of behavior causing exaptation.  
Ritualization does exhibit features that meet the requirements of such 
changes. Firstly, ritualized actions or movements owe the acquirement of novel 
intraspecific meanings to the fact of being displayed, namely they are what they 
are because “reacted to by other individuals belonging to the same species” 
(Tinbergen 1952: 23; emphasis mine). In the context of interspecific communic-
ation, ritualization comes close to some phenomena of mimicry, where the 
perceptive nature of the evolutionary process at stake stands out with equal 
importance. For Maran and Kleisner (2010: 195–196; emphases mine), 
“semiotic cooption” and “semiotic selection” represent respectively “an event 
when something is newly interpreted as meaningful within the Umwelt [the 
environment as perceived and acted upon] of an organism and further adopted 
for a particular role” and “a connection between the animal’s inner perceptual 
sphere and physical forms in nature”. 
Secondly, the elements being perceived with additional meanings follow the 
same historical destiny that is reserved to organs with new functions: just as the 
latters are subjected to incremental adaptation via natural selection, so for the 
formers “[t]his new function must have started a new evolutionary development 
during which the displacement activities became increasingly better adapted to 
it” (Tinbergen 1952: 23; emphasis mine); in the words of K. Lorenz, “[t]he 
second characteristic of ritualized motor patterns is a change of form which the 
unritualized prototype underwent in the service of its new communicative func-
tion and which quite obviously was brought about by the selection pressure 
exerted by the survival value of communication” (Lorenz 1966: 276; emphasis 
mine). 
Thirdly, the “Ab-De-In cycle” may be said to apply too. Mimicry is decep-
tive resemblance and, as a communicative system, it is “a process in which a 
message (feature or signal) of one organism, the mimic, resembles some mes-
sage of another organism, the model […]. This resemblance should have some 
functionality for the mimic by being deceptive for a third participant, the 
receiver, whose recognition and response is relevant for the mimic” (Maran 
2015: 211–212). Thus, there happens a similarity-based iconic interpretation 
where something is re-cognized as something that it is not — a wrong abductive 
perceptual judgment. This proves to be positive for one participant of the 
mimicry system and negative for the other (the slipping off of potential food), 
as a syllogistic-deductive response of no predation. Eventually, in the long run 
natural selection refines the mimetic features of the mimic in order to make 
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them better adapted to the deceptive function (and this can be seen as a type of 
negative induction). 
My second article, with the emphasis on perception, had the credit to create 
implicitly the connection between two scientific paradigms: on one side, there is 
the epistemological account according to which common knowledge and scien-
tific progress develop through hypothetical inferences and empirical testing of 
their logical consequences; on the other side, greater attention has been paid in 
the last decades to modes of evolution complementary to the neo-Darwinian 
approach and the role of functional changes triggered by epigenetic and ontoge-
netic events has acquired progressively a central position. Once the prominence 
of sensory and perceptive mechanisms is highlighted, the “Ab-De-In cycle” and 
the exaptation-fitness-adaptation sequence become overtly superimposable and 
it is here that Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ meets Gould’s post-Darwinism. 
This has a far deeper significance than usual parallelisms drawn between 
evolution and science, where genetic variance by random mutations is equated 
to hypotheses selection or construction. Abductive inference has nothing to do 
with chance, since “it is a primary hypothesis underlying all abduction that the 
human mind is akin to the truth in the sense that in a finite number of guesses it 
will light upon the correct hypothesis” (CP 7.220); as for the entertainment of a 
specific theory that proves to be true, “[y]ou cannot say that it happened by 
chance, because the possible theories, if not strictly innumerable, at any rate 
exceed a trillion” (CP 5.591). If Darwinian fortuitous variations are blind to 
their phenotypic effects, sensory-driven choices, despite being at first tentative, 
rest upon a variability which is confined within a regularity — that is the ulti-
mate meaning of Peirce’s continuity when applied to iconicity. This is clear 
when it comes to science and can be extended downward to animal behavior: 
“man has a certain Insight […] into the Thirdnesses, the general elements, of 
Nature. An Insight, I call it, because it is to be referred to the same general class 
of operations to which Perceptive Judgments belong” (CP 5.173). That is to say, 
if an instinct or habit is applied successfully in response to a specific sensory 
quality, the same holds true hypothetically for the set of all objects possessing it. 
This said, a further step must be taken. If in the mimicry system the subject 
undergoing modifications because of the selective pressure of a perceiver is 
passive, the fullest overlap between exaptation and abduction requires the 
detection of situations where the very organism — the species it represents — 
performing the misleading perception is accountable for its own morphological 
transformations over the following generations. The notion of context, on which 
my second work dwelt diffusely to try to single out the logical elements 
involved in the functional shift (be it either communicative or not) of a trait, can 
be translated in that of ecological niche. Since it comprises, along with environ-
mental features promoting fitness, the behavioral adaptations of a living being 
(with the inherent possibility of their plastic tuning to similar conditions), the 
linking of exaptation and abduction meets the paradigm of a constructivist 
ecology where organisms create their own conditions of survival through a truly 
experimental attitude. 
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5. THE ICONIC AND EXAPTIVE LOGIC OF  
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The third article (Weible 2013) has taken on the shape of a pilot study, rather 
than being a finished work standing by itself. In this, together with the attempt 
to open up new research directions, it has confirmed some of the results previ-
ously achieved. First of all, the switch of context accountable for the functional 
shift has been redefined in terms of “selective regime” (Baum, Larson 1991: 5; 
emphases mine), which “assesses, given the ecological circumstance, how 
selection is expected to sort character variation” and thus “describes the action 
of natural selection contingent upon the organism's ecology”. The subordination 
of micro-evolutionary events to ecological dynamics can be due, among differ-
ent alternatives, to behavioral innovations, so that “a novel organismal feature 
can change the way selection acts upon other organismal character variation and 
hence modify the selective regime” (Baum, Larson 1991: 5). Specifically, the 
following case study conjectures a scenario where a new feeding habit, by 
modifying the ecological rules, has led to a morphological exaptation and its 
further adaptation. 
Secondly, the two analogies drawn between organs and tools — problem-
solving solutions and recursive hierarchy — left in the background one aspect 
that now, after having shown the convergence between specific types of exapta-
tion and abduction, comes out in all its centrality. In his work on the nature of 
technology, Arthur detects many similarities between its development, biologi-
cal evolution and scientific progress. On one hand, beneath the commonplace 
approach that views them as complementary activities, thereby reducing tech-
nology to applied science, there lies a deeper connection, which goes back to 
their being intellectual enterprises grounded on the same cognitive matrix. Sev-
eral passages by Arthur (2009) confirms this: 
 
What about scientific experiments? Are these related to technology too? 
Certainly some are mere prospectings in the hope of lucky discoveries. 
But the serious ones are systematic probes into the workings of nature 
and are undertaken always with a definite purpose in mind. They are 
therefore means to human purposes; they are method technologies, 
encased or embodied in physical apparatus (Arthur 2009: 62; emphasis 
mine). 
 
Science […] builds its understanding from its scientific explanations, 
from its reasonings and theories about how the world works. Surely, we 
can say, these at least are far away from technology. 
Well, not quite. Explanations certainly do not feel like technologies. 
But they are constructions with a purpose. 
[…] From all this it follows that science not only uses technology, it 
builds itself from technology. Not the standard set of technologies such 
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as bridges and steel production methods and shipping, of course. Science 
builds itself from the instruments, methods, experiments, and conceptual 
constructions it uses. This should not be surprising. Science, after all, is a 
method: a method for understanding, for probing, for explaining. A 
method composed of many sub methods. Stripped to its core structure, 
science is a form of technology (Arthur 2009: 63–64; emphases mine). 
 
That origination in science or in mathematics is not fundamentally differ-
ent from that in technology should not be surprising. The correspond-
ences exist not because science and mathematics are the same as tech-
nology. They exist because all three are purposed systems — means to 
purposes, broadly interpreted — and therefore must follow the same 
logic. All three are constructed from forms or principles: in the case of 
technology, conceptual methods; in the case of science, explanatory 
structures; in the case of mathematics, truth structures consistent with 
basic axioms. Technology, scientific explanation, and mathematics there-
fore come into being via similar types of heuristic process — fundamen-
tally a linking between a problem and the forms that will satisfy it (Arthur 
2009: 129; emphases mine). 
 
If the same logical structure applies to the connection between scientific 
explanations and natural data on one side and between technological artifacts 
and problematic situations on the other side, a spontaneous question arises: does 
technology involve abduction? My third article has documented how closely 
living beings and artifacts resemble each other insofar the phenomenon of re-
functionalization is concerned; to use Arthur’s words, the “lock-in of an older 
successful principle causes a phenomenon I will call adaptive stretch. When a 
new circumstance comes along or a demand for a different sphere of application 
arrives, it is easier to reach for the old technology — the old base principle — 
and adapt it by “stretching” it to cover the new circumstances” (Arthur 2009: 
140). In the Italian translation of Arthur’s book, there occurs a footnote quali-
fying that “it looks like the biological phenomenon of exaptation” (Arthur 2011: 
124). When such quotations are compared to Peirce’s writings, it does seem that 
technology depends on something akin to hypothetical inference and exhibits 
the Ab-De-In cycle. In science, as well as in daily reasoning, explanations as 
solutions are suggested by the situation itself and, in turn, suggestion comes 
along through association by similarity (and by spatial-temporal contiguity). As 
for this aspect, namely how explanatory theories are generated to account for 
surprising facts, Peirce has insisted on it throughout his long thinking over the 
issue: 
 
Upon finding himself confronted with a phenomenon unlike what he 
would have expected under the circumstances, he looks over its features 
and notices some remarkable character or relation among them, which he 
at once recognizes as being characteristic of some conception with which 
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his mind is already stored, so that a theory is suggested which would 
explain (that is, render necessary) that which is surprising in the phenom-
ena. (CP 2.776) 
 
Abduction, in the sense I give the word, is any reasoning of a large class 
of which the provisional adoption of an explanatory hypothesis is the 
type. But it includes processes of thought which lead only to the sugges-
tion of questions to be considered, and includes much besides. (CP 4.541) 
 
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements 
of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting 
together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which 
flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation. (CP 5.181) 
 
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only justification 
is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be 
tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to under-
stand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought 
about. No reason whatsoever can be given for it, as far as I can discover; 
and it needs no reason, since it merely offers suggestions. (CP 5.171) 
 
If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is 
nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That is, pragma-
tism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any 
further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, 
that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions. 
(CP 5.196) 
 
Every concept, doubtless, first arises when upon a strong, but more or 
less vague, sense of need is superinduced some involuntary experience of 
a suggestive nature; that being suggestive which has a certain occult rela-
tion to the build of the mind. We may assume that it is the same with the 
instinctive ideas of animals; and man's ideas are quite as miraculous as 
those of the bird, the beaver, and the ant […]. Every concept, every gen-
eral proposition of the great edifice of science, first came to us as a 
conjecture. These ideas are the first logical interpretants of the phenom-
ena that suggest them, and which, as suggesting them, are signs, of which 
they are the (really conjectural) interpretants. (CP 5.480) 
 
Such a repeated use of the same term indicates a conceptual choice that is not 
casual and supposes a precise account of how theories or hypothesis come to 
mind. Although Peirce did not offer an explicit definition of the psychological 
mechanism of suggestion, the very same process has been however described 
with a little more detail by another pragmatist and this can provide some help 
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and insight in understanding its meaning. For John Dewey, when facing a diffi-
culty, “the next step is suggestion of some way out — the formation of some 
tentative plan or project, the entertaining of some theory which will account for 
the peculiarities in question, the consideration of some solution for the prob-
lem” (Dewey 1910: 12; emphasis mine); the data at hand supply hints by means 
of past experience and prior knowledge, which ust be considered the actual 
sources of suggestion: “If the person has had some acquaintance with similar 
situations, if he has dealt with material of the same sort before, suggestions 
more or less apt and helpful are likely to arise” (Dewey 1910: 12; emphases 
mine); again, solutions cannot be provided “unless there has been experience in 
some degree analogous” (Dewey 1910: 12; emphasis mine). If similarity and 
analogy are involved, it is plausible that something akin to iconicity is affecting 
the cognitive process of suggestion. 
Further examination shows this is the correct interpretation. Here it is the 
example adopted by Dewey to clarify the mechanism: 
  
A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he 
observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other 
things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to 
rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun, and he 
then quickens his steps. What, if any thing, in such a situation can be 
called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a 
thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other 
modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something 
suggested. The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a 
coming shower. (Dewey 1910: 6-7) 
 
This can be formalized according to Peirce’s three modes of inference. Firstly, 
an abduction occurs — if it is getting colder (fact), it is like (iconic relation) any 
previous time (past experience at disposal) where cooling was associated with 
raining (rule), so the fact can be tentatively interpreted as a result of such rule 
and the case that is going to rain soon is established (mere possibility, since 
there happens instances were cold temperature is in fact dissociated from rains). 
Secondly, the hypothesis needs to be tested and therefore consequences or fur-
ther connections to be verified empirically must be developed: rain comes from 
clouds. Eventually, clouding is spotted and the explanation supported induc-
tively. Instead of recurring to common images, Dewey’s description is a good 
case of thermoceptive abduction or iconicity; obviously, the same holds true for 
vision: “there is the same sort of situation as when one looking at a cloud is 
reminded of a human figure and face. Thinking […] involves a noted or per-
ceived fact, followed by something else which is not observed but which is 
brought to mind, suggested by the thing seen. One reminds us, as we say, of the 
other” (Dewey 1910: 7). The example of rain is however remarkable in its affin-
ity with the logical place of hypothetical inference within Peirce’s classification 
of modalities: “The danger of rain…presents itself to us as a genuine possibility 
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— as a possible fact of the same nature as the observed coolness. Put differently 
[…] we consider the possibility and nature of the connection between the object 
seen and the object suggested” (Dewey 1910: 7; emphases mine). 
If the imaginative process of suggestion in scientific and daily problem-
solving follows the logic of abduction, it is by no surprise that technology — 
itself a human achievement based on imagination — obeys the same rules. To 
begin with, the idea of technological development as something linear, 
mechanic and repetitive must be abandoned: “[e]ngineering is often held to be 
less creative than other fields where design is important — architecture, for 
example, or music […]. The design process in engineering is not different in 
principle from that in architecture, or fashion, or music for that matter. It is a 
form of composition, of expression, and as such it is open to all the creativity 
we associate with these” (Arthur 2009: 98). Besides, just as people reactivate 
past experience to deal with everyday problems and reuse solutions that have 
proved to be effective, so technology is based on the same selective working: at 
the heart of invention “lies the act of seeing a suitable solution in action — 
seeing a suitable principle that will do the job” (Arthur 2009: 121) and to do so 
“I am reaching into my store of everyday functionalities, selecting some to 
combine” (Arthur 2009: 121); thus, “[t]he originator reaches into a store of 
these and imagines what will happen when certain ones are combined” (Arthur 
2009: 122). To synthetize, “[i]nvention at its core is mental association” 
(Arthur 2009: 122; emphasis mine). 
But what kind of association? For Arthur “[w]hen originators need a certain 
function they can associate back to a principle that produced a one in a field 
they know about. At the core of this mechanism — call it principle transfer — 
is seeing an analogy. This is another form of mental association” (Arthur 2009: 
122; emphases mine). When facing a problem that requires a technical solution, 
people resort to tools that, in similar conditions, have already been applied 
successfully. The cognitive working at stake is outright abductive — Peirce 
meets Arthur, almost with the same words: “[o]rigination in scientific theo-
rizing, as in technology, is at bottom a linking — a linking of the observational 
givens of a problem with a principle (a conceptual insight) that roughly suggests 
these, and eventually with a complete set of principles that reproduces these” 
(Arthur 2009: 128; emphases mine). Darwin developed the theory of natural 
selection because of the similarities between his discoveries in nature and the 
consequences of Malthus’ account on populations’ dynamics. Kepler “found 
that the observed longitudes of Mars […] were thus, in so far, a likeness of 
those of motion in an elliptic orbit” and this “did incline him to that idea so 
much as to decide him to undertake to ascertain whether virtual predictions 
about the latitudes and parallaxes based on this hypothesis would be verified or 
not” (CP 2.96). Similarly, correspondence between given and past problems 
prompt us to adopt the same options and technical progress follows in part the 
logical formalization of hypotheses adoption: “The surprising fact, C, is 
observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is 
reason to suspect that A is true” (CP 5.189) — a problem C arises and needs a 
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solution; but if the solution A were adopted, C would be solved (on the basis of 
the similarities perceived between the defining features of C and those solved 
by the application of A); hence, there is reason to suspect that A is the solving 
possibility among the storehouse of available options. In turn, this reproduces 
the Ab-De-In cycle, since once adopted (either mentally, in case of methods or 
projects, or physically) the available artifacts need to be implemented in the 
actual context, where the supposed likeness might in fact turn out to be deceitful 
and lead to non optimal or wrong results. 
The merit of the third article lies therefore in its having paved the way to the 
acknowledgement that organs and tools, when belonging to specific subtypes of 
technological development and biological evolution, undergo re-functionaliza-
tion in pretty much the same way, by means of behavioral acts (whether they be 
highly abstract or pure reflexes) grounded on perceived similarities which elicit 
specific interpretations. All which has been achieved thus far can now be put on 
trial with the description of a case study and the relative call for experimental 
testing. 
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6. THE ORIGIN OF BLOODSUCKING:  
A CASE OF EVOLUTIONARY ABDUCTION? 
As I quoted at the very beginning of this introduction, for Arnold (1994: 138) 
“when the ancestors of carnivorous hemipteran bugs transferred from sucking 
sap on feeding on the internal fluids of animals, there was at least a brief phase 
where they did both. So their hypodermic proboscis was initially an addition 
exaptation to exploiting animal fluids, but later became a transfer exaptation”. 
Indeed, there is quite an agreement among evolutionary biologists that a similar 
behavior, hematophagy or blood-sucking, might have evolved in insects 
through the application of existing adaptations to a different feeding habit. 
Lehane (2005) provides a useful introduction thereupon, arguing that feeding 
on blood arose independently at least six times among the arthropods of the 
Jurassic and Cretaceous periods, following two possible routes. In the first, 
“haematophagous forms may have developed subsequent to a prolonged 
association between vertebrates and insects that had no specializations immedi-
ately suiting them to the bloodsucking way of life” (Lehane 2005: 7). In the 
second, which interests me most, “blood feeding developed in some insect line-
ages from ancestral insects that were morphologically pre-adapted for piercing 
surfaces” (Lehane 2005: 13). Waage (1979) discusses this possibility in detail 
and provides many examples. For instance, “[e]ctoparasitism appears to have 
evolved in the Hemiptera through (1) a primary preadaptation of mouthparts 
for piercing and sucking, (2) secondary evolution of an association with verte-
brate dwellings and (3) facultative haematophagy followed by behavioural and 
physiological adaptations permitting more efficient blood-feeding” (Waage 
1979: 192; emphasis mine). Or, “Nematocera and Brachycera Tabaniformia 
[…] appear to have evolved from a stock preadapted as adults for bloodsucking 
by their piercing mouthparts and predatory behaviour, with regular host associa-
tions being a subsequent evolutionary step” (Waage 1979: 199; emphasis mine). 
Also, “[t]he mouthparts of most moths are clearly preadapted for feeding on 
tears and other free liquids […]. True blood-sucking behaviour, however, has 
evolved in the noctuid, Calpe eustrigata […]. This species belongs to a group 
of moths which as adults suck the juices of fruits after piercing the rinds with 
highly modified, sharp-tipped proboscis […]. These feeding modifications 
clearly preadapted members of this group for a shift to piercing vertebrate tis-
sues” (Waage 1979: 202; emphases mine). 
The issue is summed up as follow: 
 
For the great majority of insects, vertebrate associations are accidental 
and of neutral or negative value to the insect’s fitness. The transition 
from this sort of relationship to a positive commensal or ectoparasitic 
relationship has required, in every case, a number of morphological, 
behavioural and physiological adaptations. These adaptations may be 
classified into two general groups: 
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(1) Adaptations promoting regular physical association with the host. 
These include habitat preference, host-finding behaviour and 
morphological adaptations to living on the host. 
(2) Adaptations promoting the capacity to feed on the host. These 
include mouthpart structure, the physiological capacity to digest host 
substances and the behaviour associated with the initiation and 
termination of feeding. (Waage 1979: 203) 
 
A key characteristic of these two hypothetical pathways is the presence of 
preadaptations towards ectoparasitism prior to selection for adaptations 
directly promoting this lifestyle. Characters preadaptive for one pathway 
are evolved secondarily in the other. A crucial role for preadaptation is 
general to the evolution of parasitic relationships. (Waage 1979: 206; 
emphasis mine) 
 
What remains implicit is however the role of those modifications taking place 
during organisms’ lifetime, due to learning and able to stabilize in a sufficient 
permanent way the ecto-parasitic relationship. That the second evolutionary 
route leading to hematophagy is very likely a good instance of Baldwin’s 
organic selection is testified somehow by Downes (1971), who — after noticing 
that “mouthparts of biting flies are adapted for cutting through a membrane and 
taking up by suction the fluid or semi-fluid material thus exposed, but […] they 
do not appear to be specialized for blood-sucking as such” (Downes 1971: 245) 
and remembering that Mecoptera have also been seen to feed on both live and 
dead insect — asks the following: “Are we then observing here the original 
condition in the Diptera — a biting and sucking feeding apparatus fully estab-
lished in structure and function, but not yet canalized by behaviour to living, 
and still less to vertebrate, sources of food?” (Downes 1971: 245; emphasis 
mine). This supposition looks like obeying the ecological and behavioral pattern 
of the exaptation-fitness-adaptation sequence referred to before: a change in 
behavior (vertebrate association) modifies the selective regime and coopts 
existing organs for a slightly different function, which in turn, since promoting 
fitness in the form of longevity and fecundity, becomes susceptible to the 
screening of natural selection and undergoes progressive and gradual adaptive 
refinements. 
The scenario meets the requirements of the Ab-De-In cycle too: the new 
feeding habit, a (slight) variation with respect to the previous instinctive action 
and hypothetical at its inception as for the capacity to enhance organisms’ apti-
tude towards the environment, has proved to be successful — “[t]he nutritional 
advantage of feeding on host tissues, ultimately blood, is presumably associated 
with the acquisition of nitrogen to promote longevity and egg production” 
(Waage 1979: 207); specific consequences have made it “visible” to the testing 
action of natural selection, which has worked incrementally on the traits 
performing the new task. What remains to be shown, however, is that the origi-
nal and incidental host association triggering the cascade effects was abductive 
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itself, namely depending on a sensory mechanism based on some kind of simi-
larity and its iconic recognition. 
My analysis is restricted to the functional shift of mouthparts, but it must be 
emphasized the multifactorial nature of the historical process that gave birth to 
the different types of bloodsucking. After examination, any single lineage can 
exhibit the intersection of several complementary exaptive changes, involving 
not only single organs, but physiological compounds and action schemas as 
well: as a matter of fact, cooption can affect morphological, physiological 
or/and behavioral traits. For instance, “the presumed ancestors of these 
haematophagous groups, the Anthocoridae and predatory Reduviidae, both use 
salivary venom to immobilize prey […]. Perhaps these secretions represent, in 
both groups, the progenitors of anesthetic secretions which permitted painless 
feeding on hosts in later-evolved haematophagous forms” (Waage 1979: 192). 
Or, since “blood is richest in nitrogen, but much of this is locked in haemo-
globin (Hb) and other proteins which may be inaccessible to evolving vertebrate 
associates”, then “[i]nsects switching from entomophagy to haematophagy 
(Pathway II) might be expected to possess some of the necessary proteases, in 
other forms this digestive capacity may evolve more gradually” (Waage 1979: 
207). Eventually, in Ceratopogon, Clinohelea, Palpomyia and other related 
genera the females hunt in swarms keep together by visual landmarks of the 
same nature as those that define the site of the mating assembly, namely “it 
appears in fact that the specialization of these midges consists in the adoption 
by the female of a behaviour pattern typically associated with mating in her 
hunting behavior also” (Downes 1970: 245). 
When questioning how the changeover might have come about, along with 
being multifactorial it has probably originated at the same time from very 
different precursory feeding habits. On one hand, entomophagous insects, while 
hunting for their preys in nests or burrows or regularly congregating in wet 
areas used as breeding sites, “could have made repeated and possibly prolonged 
contact with vertebrates. These predatory insects would have physiological and 
morphological adaptations […] facilitating the switch to haematophagy” 
(Lehane 2005: 13). On the other hand, the shift might have regarded plant-feed-
ing or sap-sucking ancestors: “[t]his is certainly a possibility as many plant-
feeding insects possess piercing and sucking mouthparts that would pre-adapt 
them for haematophagy” (Lehane 2005: 14). Once attracted to free-living verte-
brates to feed on bodily secretions or fruits and seeds stored by them, close and 
continued association with the host would have then prompted the path towards 
modern-day blood feeders. 
In general, support to the theory of preadaptation (i.e., exaptation) comes 
from two important considerations. From a morphological and physiological 
viewpoint, “features which are characteristic of parasites are by no means pecu-
liar to them” (Rothschild 1957: 52) and thus “it is easy to see that any animal 
might already possess one or several of these specializations before it took to 
the parasitic mode of life” (Rothschild 1957: 53). Furthermore, “if individuals 
vary at all pre-adaptation must exist […]. To say that plants and animals may be 
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pre-adapted is really only another way of saying they are not all alike, for every 
variation is potentially both adaptive and pre-adaptive” (Rothschild 1957: 53). 
Since blood is a nutritious organic substance, other animal classes have 
developed feeding habits resembling the insects’ pierce-and-suck scheme—
insect themselves, not surprisingly, have come to be subjected to parasitism by 
nematodes, whose possibility to start a parasitic life “was clearly improved by a 
set of preadaptations or preconditions that evolved as a complex of adaptations 
to a saprobiontic life in short-lived substrates formed by decaying material” 
(Sudhaus 2008: 146), before turning to exploit insect intestine. In bats, for 
instance, hematophagy has evolved once, leading to three living species of 
vampires: Desmodus rotundus, Diaemus youngi and Diphylla ecadata. Three 
theories have been advanced to account for its origin (Fenton 1992: 164): for 
the first, “vampire bats evolved from frugivorous species with teeth capable of 
cutting the hard ring of fruit”; for the second, “a progenitor of vampire bats fed 
on the ectoparasites of large mammals and by this route adopted a sanguinivo-
rous life style”; for the third, “sanguinivory is a specialization derived from 
feeding at wounds on large mammals”. The last theory is particularly inter-
esting, since it suits well the hypothesis of an evolutionary scenario involving at 
the same time ontogenetic behavioral modifications and coopted organs. As for 
the first aspect, “[p]rotovampire bats would have learned that at wound sites 
they could feed on insects as well as on the tissues and blood of the large mam-
mals” (Fenton 1992: 166; emphasis mine); as for the second, access to such 
kind and range of food opportunities would have been affected by the upper 
incisor teeth of bats: specifically, “blade-like upper incisor teeth would have 
permitted bats frontal access to wounds, and sharper teeth would have made the 
bats’ activities at wounds less conspicuous to the host” (Fenton 1992: 167). 
This is how Fenton sums it up: 
 
To feed effectively at existing wounds, protovampire bats would have 
had to possess strong upper incisor teeth and the behavioral flexibility to 
recognize and exploit this feeding opportunity. The involvement of the 
tongue outside the mouth also would have been important and this pattern 
of behaviour is one that vampire bats share with modern flower-visiting 
phyllostomids. The combination of phyllostomid exaptations (sensu 
Gould & Vrba, 1982) and the unique South American mammal fauna 
may together explain the origin of blood-feding bats in the Neotropics. 
(Fenton 1992: 169; emphases mine) 
 
Schutt (2008) has modified the second evolutionary scenario by claiming that 
blood feeding might have originated from grooming behavior aimed at getting 
rid of ectoparasites. However, small size and difficulty to locate them, along 
with the contrast between their worldwide distribution and bats’ restricted habi-
tats, work against this thesis (Schutt 2008: 49). As for the wound-feeding 
hypothesis, it collides with the uselessness of echolocation in differentiating 
wounded from unwounded preys and it is very difficult to envisage what kind 
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of selective pressure might have driven protovampires to switch from an insect-
eating lifestyle to one dependent on locating large wounds and especially on 
blood, because of the difficulty to obtain it (Schutt 2008: 50–51). Eventually, 
the frugivore hypothesis poses problems too, because the exact dynamics of the 
changeover has never been satisfactorily developed so has to explain clearly 
how or why it occurred (Schutt 2008: 51). Whatever the exact scenario, since 
they were encountering an increasingly diverse arboreal fauna too large to be 
stalked and killed with existing strategies, it is plausible that over time “isolated 
populations of some carnivorous phyllostomid may have undergone a behav-
ioral shift that allowed them to exploit these larger animals as a food source” 
(Schutt 2008: 54; emphasis mine). 
In the case of birds, what can be seen nowadays in Darwin’s Galápagos 
finches could actually be thought of like a natural evolutionary ‘laboratory’, 
displaying ‘live’ how things could have gone, mutatis mutandis, in other clas-
ses. As for Geospiza difficilis septentrionalis, it appears to be “the first example 
from the bird world of a species in which one of the primary objectives in 
foraging is the procurement of blood” (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 29). Occasion-
ally, also other species perform the same method of feeding: the Red-billed ox-
pecker or Tick-bird (Buphagus erythrorhynchus), for example, “feeds on ticks 
(primary food) infesting domestic stock and wild game and at times drinks the 
blood (secondary food) when it oozes from an animal and clots at a spot where 
several ticks have been attached” (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 40). Some common 
features have been advanced to define in general such predatory behavior, 
whether intentional or accidental: the attacks occur at times when usual food is 
less available; only some individuals acquire it, presumably by learning; behav-
ioral predispositions are needed, such as lack of fear, curiosity, boldness, 
omnivorousness. As for the possible origin of the habit, the following explana-
tion (somehow halfway between the second and third scenarios envisioned for 
vampire bats evolution) is put forward: 
 
In their foraging on the ground, the finches come into close proximity to 
nesting and loafing Masked Boobies. During the dry season, when free-
living insects are less available, the boobies present a concentration of 
black hippoboscid flies that are very visible on the white plumage. The 
agile and fearless finches readily pursue the hippoboscids on the boobies, 
and, as a result of their success, turn regularly to this new near-constant 
source of food. The finches acquire a taste for blood, possibly by eating 
blood-engorged flies, or by overzealous stabbing at flies amidst the plum-
age, causing an accidental puncture of the booby skin. When the white 
plumage of the booby becomes accidentally smeared with blood, non-
hippoboscid flies are attracted to it, which serves to heighten the interest 
of the finches in the boobies. (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 41–42; emphases 
mine) 
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In addition to being probably sensory-driven by the gustatory recognition of 
blood, the omnivorous habit is supported at the same time by a “sufficiently 
generalized” (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 41) elongate, smallish, conical bill, able to 
be recruited for different actions: on Wolf Island members of Geospiza difficilis 
use their bills to pierce and eat the contents of seabirds' eggs; or “[h]opping 
about the rocks and ashy soil, this species turns over leaf litter using the bill” 
(Bowman, Billeb 1965: 37); besides, also cactus feeding has been observed. 
Since blood “probably constitutes only a minor part of the total food intake of 
the species” (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 37), it is reasonable to assume that hema-
tophagy in birds does involve an exaptation-like cooption of the bill for slightly 
different functions, on the basis of ecological opportunities newly exploited and 
sustained by behavioral attitudes.  
Does such a live observation of a possible new evolutionary trend suggest 
anything that might be applied retrospectively to the past changeovers occurred 
for insects? A clue comes from the fact that Geospiza difficilis feeds on avian 
blood “in the absence of a ready source of fresh drinking water” (Bowman, 
Billeb 1965: 38); equally, “attacks […] occur at times when natural foods are 
less available” (Bowman, Billeb 1965: 41). The same is said by Curry and 
Anderson (1987: 519): “Blood drinking may occur predominantly during dry 
seasons when other foods are scarce. The blood drinking we observed took 
place during dry periods in both 1984 and 1985. Blood drinking was less fre-
quent under wetter conditions in 1986”. It must be remembered that, for vam-
pire bats, Fenton’s hypothesis “involves a transition from an insectivorous diet 
to one mixing insect larvae and body fluids and thence to one involving only 
blood” (Fenton 1992: 168).  
In some respect, there happens thus the phenomenon of substitution above 
referred to, in this case ecologically affected by food distribution. But, if water 
and blood (because of its water-content) have analogous and partly interchange-
able physiological values, does it imply that Galápagos finches are perceiving 
them similar to each other too? Their exploratory behavior has been selected on 
the basis of several ecological factors and, although it “may be motivated by 
neophilia, which is defined as the spontaneous attraction of an animal to a food 
item, place, or object because it is novel” (Tebbich et al. 2009: 592; emphasis 
mine) — thereby implying not resemblance, but rather contrast — however it 
has been shown that in captivity “woodpecker finches soon approached objects 
of similar size and structure, but it often took several hours until they started 
manipulating them (Tebbich et al. 2009: 601; emphasis mine). Under given 
constraints, finches’ need for water might well compel them to extend the 
drinking attempts to anything recognized as liquid and, because of operant 
conditioning, to learn new potential sources. If it is not easy to decide whether 
for members of Geospiza difficilis the blood feeding habit is grounded or not on 
‘wrong’ — to say, generalized — perceptions, what about insects? Do they 
make mistakes? Rothschild is explicit in this respect: 
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Many of the arthropod parasites of birds, such as bugs, mosquitoes, and 
ticks, were originally suckers of plant juices. As the geological record 
proves, these groups evolved before birds and mammals and, no doubt, in 
the past were essentially vegetarians. It is a relatively easy matter for 
them to pierce the skin of an animal either accidentally, in error, or 
deliberately if no other food is available, and to extract its body fluids. 
These accidental and casual drinks of blood which no doubt originally 
took the form of an occasional meal might easily become a habit, and 
then a necessity. (Rothschild 1957: 48; emphasis mine) 
 
Literature abounds with examples and, in light of the hypothesis I am putting 
forward, it is important to stress those factors influencing the unusual behavior. 
Faúndez and Carvajal (2011: 408; emphasis mine) have reported, despite 
Nabids being general predators of small arthropods, a human case of biting by 
Nabis punctipennis, so explained: “[b]ecause the nabid was not detected until it 
attacked, and because of the amount of blood found in its abdomen, we believe 
the bug was attempting to obtain water and/or solutes”. Baena (2011: 400; 
emphasis mine) provides a list of references about unusual feeding habits of 
Heteroptera and reports that, although a predator of small insects, “genus Geo-
coris is known as accidental biter to man […] in arid regions of North Africa”. 
Waage (1979: 191) reports of several phytophagous and insectivorous Hemip-
tera that have been seen ‘biting’ humans and quotes the case of Lyctocoris 
campestris, which has been seen on a number of occasions to pierce human skin 
— and “will, in fact, take a blood meal” — and is especially interesting since 
intermediate between predatory ‘flower bugs’ and hematophagous ‘bed bugs’. 
Besides, “[s]ome predatory Diptera are occasionally attracted to vertebrates; the 
rhagionid […] has been observed to feed on human sweat […] a behaviour 
possibly related to the habit of feeding on water droplets and aphid and plant 
exudates exhibited by other rhagionids” (Waage (1979: 195; emphases mine). 
Also Lehane (2005: 13–14) underlines that the lifestyle of different extant 
insects supports the evolutionary scenario from entomophagy to hematophagy 
and, as a personal experience, describes the case of a flower bug Anthocoris 
nemorum: normally, he lives around flowers pouncing on small insects visiting 
them, “[w]hile its probings of my skin cause a sharp pain, I have yet to find one 
that has obviously ingested any blood; however, it still establishes the fact that 
entomophagous insects will often show an interest in vertebrates as potential 
sources of a meal”. Bailey (1936) refers about thrips (normally considered 
phytophagous and to some extent predaceous) attacking man transitorily and, 
supposedly, attempting to suck in order to obtain moisture and not blood; by 
quoting J. W. Evans, he writes that “thrips act in this manner during periods of 
high temperature accompanied by low humidity (better expressed as saturation 
deficit), the reaction being entirely due to the fact that the insects will alight on 
any moist surface at these times” (Bailey 1936: 96; emphasis mine). There also 
happens something akin to the effect of electric traps for mosquitoes: once 
drawn to the wet surface of large tanks of water, they have been drowned and 
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“the insects do not merely rest on the wet surface but attempt […] to draw up 
the water” (Bailey 1936: 96). 
Myers (1929) offers akin suggestions. After having pointed out that all the 
cases of occasional biting and blood-sucking have taken place under excep-
tional circumstances, he comes close to my research hypothesis: 
 
The Homoptera especially, being much more generalized feeders than the 
Heteroptera, are accustomed to drawing their liquid nourishment from 
almost any portion of the vegetable substratum on which they normally 
rest. How easily leafhoppers may be induced to pierce and suck under 
entirely unnatural conditions is shown in the ingenious technique of 
Carter. The liquid used — whether plain water or various solutions of 
plant sap — was contained in a rough bag made by tying up a piece of 
“fish skin” (apparently swim-bladder). This was suspended from the roof 
of the cage and was freely sucked by the insects. The psychic element in 
piercing and sucking when a leafhopper finds itself on a pierceable sur-
face with liquid beneath must be so small as to be almost negligible. 
Under great mental stress, we pace up and down unconsciously and use-
lessly. Similarly a leafhopper, under the overwhelming influence of one 
great stimulus, that of artificial light, flies about its source, alights on 
nearly objects, and if these be animal bodies, pierces and sucks them 
(Myers 1929: 477–478; emphasis mine). 
 
In a way, this consequence can be understood as though the discriminative 
threshold on some sensory dimension had been amplified, thereby inducing the 
animal to categorize as functionally or perceptually similar objects that, nor-
mally, are kept distinct. Were two entities ideally different under any respect 
from a perceptive viewpoint, this would not invalidate their iconicity however, 
since it is an interpretative process that must not be confused with factual 
similarity. And this of course is in line with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: if two 
objects have same bearings, they have the same meaning and can be thought of 
as being analogous entities.  
Provided to be liquid, anything goes. The need of salt determines compa-
rable conducts and the case of moths is exemplificative. Within the order 
Lepidoptera, hematophagy is restricted to the moth genus Calyptra, whose 
members have adapted mouthparts that enable them to pierce through the skin 
of animals. Only ten out of the seventeen species described perform the habit 
under natural or experimental conditions and only males take blood meals as a 
facultative choice. By reporting field observations and experiments with 
Calyptra minuticornis, C. orthograpta and C. labilis, Bänziger (1979) suggests 
that these three species of moth are likely to be at least occasional blood-suck-
ers. No direct skin-piercing was observed on animals, but: firstly, it did happen 
with the author’s finger; secondly, the general piercing mechanism and probos-
cis morphology range from similar to almost identical to those of the classical 
skin-piercing blood-sucking C. eustrigata. There are good reasons to believe 
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then that this feeding habit is likely to occur in natural conditions. To explain in 
part the behavior of these Lepidoptera, Bänziger (1979: 35; emphasis mine) 
remarks that “water loss through evaporation in dry-hot air may be compen-
sated for by production of metabolic water through combustion of fat as in 
clothes-moths […] or possibly diminished by larger intake of salt. Blood offers 
both”. Thus, a particular ecological setting can in fact sustain an occasional 
attitude aimed at obtaining the same nutrients from different sources, which 
become functionally equivalent.  
Besides, genus Calyptra belongs to a larger subfamily Calpinae whose adult 
members include, within the range of their feeding behaviors, fruit-piercing. 
Zaspel et al. (2012: 790), despite not investigating the conditions that might 
have affected the initial shift, by using a Bayesian method of ancestral state 
reconstruction (molecular phylogenetic analysis) concludes that male adult 
hematophagy in Calpini aroused from a “directional addition of feeding types 
from nectar feeding to fruit piercing, to skin piercing and blood feeding” and, 
above all, “[s]election for salt collection and transfer to females is the most 
likely explanation for this facultative behavior”. In addition, the skin-piercing 
blood-sucking Calyptra eustrigata is closely related to the fruit-piercing moth 
C. thalictri, with “the two species resembling each other so strongly that only 
the comparison of the genitalia allows their exact determination” and “observa-
tions confirmed that the piercing behaviour of the fruit-piercing and the skin-
piercing moths is very similar” (Bänziger 1970: 54), to the extent that the for-
mer can be studied indirectly through analysis of the latter.  
In conclusion, in the case of moths it is possible to observe, within a single 
genus, many of the features defining the leading hypothesis: functional equiva-
lence between different foods, grounded on their sharing a common element 
(sodium); a behavior-driven choice (occasional blood-feeding) depending on 
ecological factors; the same organ (mouthparts for piercing and sucking) 
adopted — and perhaps exapted — for slightly different functions in related 
species. Given certain environmental conditions, the quest for water or salt and 
their generalized detection are able to trigger the stereotypical feeding sequence 
involving alighting, probing, piercing and sucking, which in turn brings insects 
into contact with entities not belonging normally to the set of their ecological 
relations; in a way, all the humid and salty things become the same thing and 
contextual stimuli that usually would elicit an avoidance reaction are ignored. 
The same principle holds true for the evolution of analogous feeding habits too: 
for instance, as for the origin of lachryphagy, “initial feeding on dung, urine and 
carrion is found in many Lepidoptera […] and these substances may share with 
animal secretions certain nutrients or attractants which facilitated the shift to 
feeding on vertebrates, such as salt […] amino acids or fatty acids” (Waage 
1979: 202; for other organic compounds which can elicit unusual feeding acts, 
cf. Plotkin, Goddard 2012; Bänziger et al. 2009; Bergevin 1925; Shannon 1928) 
The idea of occasional hematophagy as a consequence of failed discrimina-
tion or hyper-generalized behavior (on the basis of organic constituents 
determining a minimal similarity) meets the conclusions of two important arti-
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cles. Usinger (1934) reports several records of phytophagous Hemiptera 
sucking blood and, after agreeing with Bergevin that attraction to exposed liq-
uids undoubtedly plays an important part, then adds what follows: 
 
The change from the sucking of plant juices to bloodsucking at first 
appears to be very great. However, upon comparison of the chemical 
constituents, it is found that, in general, the same elements are found in 
plants as in blood and often in very similar combinations although in 
very different proportions […]. Blood contains almost all of the sugars, 
proteins, salts, etc., found in plants but it is a great deal richer in nitroge-
nous materials as a whole and the type of protein is very different from 
that found in cytoplasm. Likewise the concentration […] is not so differ-
ent as to prevent the use of one or the other to an insect not accustomed 
to both. Consequently we see that what is ordinarily considered to be a 
tremendous change, namely the jump from plant sucking to blood 
sucking, may be quite within the range of possibility. (Usinger 1934: 99; 
emphases mine) 
 
Accidental biting is attributed then to three influences — unusual environmental 
conditions, attractive qualities of exposed liquids and hunger — and the evolu-
tion of the habit, among other factors, is linked to the comparable properties of 
sap and blood. The same might have been true for the changeover from hemo-
lymph to blood (i.e., from entomophagy to hematophagy) too, since the reverse, 
at least under experimental condition, does occur: in the laboratory, some 
mosquitoes have been observed to feed on insect larvae and produce viable 
eggs, which suggests that “hemolymph may be taken as a last resort if verte-
brate hosts are not available” (Harris et al. 1969: 185). 
If Usinger’s work and lab results are useful to put the stress on the relative 
substitutability of such organic liquids, so that a basic mechanism of post-inges-
tive feedback might account for the repetition and persistence of initially fortui-
tous acts, Hill et al. (2010) solves a major problem: accidental biting is rare and 
individual and does not seem to exhibit the sufficient behavioral stability and 
diffusion to elicit a Baldwinian evolutionary scenario. However, some experi-
mental results supply a way out:  
 
The description of a subset of C. thalictri males with reduced numbers of 
olfactory sensilla that take a proffered blood meal under confined experi-
mental conditions while other males do not, provides the opportunity for 
us to observe the characteristics that may be responsible for a broad-
ening of host range within a single species to include blood feeding. 
Behavioural evidence in this study […] describes non-blood feeding 
moths as orienting and moving away from a vertebrate-host, indicating 
that the non-blood feeding moth response to vertebrate odour cues is 
repulsion. We propose that a reduction in this behavioural repulsion to 
vertebrates may be the foundation of the interaction we have observed 
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between male moth and human thumb, and ultimately the use of blood as 
a new resource. The decreased number of s. coeloconica in blood feeding 
males suggests a loss of the vertebrate odour-sensitive OSNs housed 
within these sensilla and the concomitant decrease in sensitivity to verte-
brate olfactory cues. A decrease in the sensitivity to such vertebrate cues 
by individual males may indeed result in a loss of this repulsion from 
vertebrates, leading to increased zoophilic interactions and the potential 
for these moths to blood feed. Investigation into observable differences 
between the males that did not take a blood meal and those that did, 
particularly in sensory structures associated with food acquisition, may 
give us insight into at least one avenue for the adaption to blood feed. 
(Hill et al. 2010: 331; emphases mine) 
 
Both generalized behavior and failed discrimination, whether due to morpho-
logical modifications of sensory organs (cf. also Cande et al. 2012, on how 
changes at the level of chemosensory systems contribute to the diversification 
of behaviors, with evolutionary implications) or contextual physiolog-
ical/ecological conditions, point in the same direction, namely the occurrence of 
iconic phenomena as defined by Deacon. He relates iconic reference to learning 
and stimulus generalization (Deacon 1997: 78–81) and, as a matter of fact, 
specialist literature on insect learning confirms the interpretative line hitherto 
adopted insofar the issue of perception is concerned. 
Stimulus generalization is a phenomenon that has been studied in detail in 
the psychological literature and takes place when “responses conditioned to one 
stimulus can also be elicited by other stimuli on the same dimension” (Kalish 
1969: 209). It involves a gradient — “the amplitude or frequency of response 
decreases with increased differences (psychological or physical) between the 
CS [conditioned stimulus] and the test stimuli” (Kalish 1969: 209) — that can 
be obtained “for virtually any sense modality and with any stimulus dimension 
having ordinal properties” (Kalish 1969: 210). Experiments indicate that it is 
“basic to the functioning of virtually all human and infrahuman organisms. 
Pavlov regarded generalization as an exceedingly important element in the 
survival of the organism” (Kalish 1969: 210). 
Smith’s article “Merging mechanism and adaptation: An ethological 
approach to learning and generalization” (1993) contains many of the concep-
tual elements on which I have been assembling my hypothesis. Firstly, the con-
cept of error steps in, since “[s]uperficially, generalization looks like a mistake 
because a subject responds to a stimulus that has never been associated with a 
reward” (Smith 1993: 130). However, exactly such motivational variables as 
hunger or thirst affect the gradient and turn possible mistakes into exploitable 
opportunities: “might a honey bee on the brink of starvation for whom a small 
reward might be very important for ensuring survival over a short period gener-
alize more broadly than a bee that is satiated?” (Smith 1993: 131). In fact, flat-
tened gradients (which means response generalization) have been constantly 
found for stress situations in human and animals (Kalish 1969: 263), so as 
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increases in drive level under hunger, thirst and shock have resulted in 
increased responsiveness (Kalish 1969: 264). This is consistent with literature 
on insect behavior under starvation; for instance, Chapman and de Boer (1995: 
126) report the following: 
 
In some situations, as when an insect has been deprived of food for a long 
period, it may begin to feed in the absence of suitable chemosensory 
input. For example, there are many examples of locusts and grasshoppers 
eating plants that are rejected by well-fed insects (e.g., Bernays et al., 
1976). In some cases this may be the result of a shortage of water, and 
perhaps water in the unusual host acts as a phagostimulant. There are also 
examples in the literature of locusts eating inert materials, such as nylon 
screen or polystyrene. Perhaps in these situations, the palps provide no 
chemosensory information because potentially stimulating chemicals are 
absent from the material. This situation is analogous to palpectomy 
experiments.  
 
Secondly, what matters most is the conceptual and terminological affinity 
between stimulus generalization and iconicity: the “inverse hypothesis”, for 
example, assumes that “the organism’s inability to respond differentially to 
changes in the stimulus dimension (discriminability) is the basis for stimulus 
generalization” (Chapman, de Boer 1995: 233; emphasis mine); or “discrimina-
tion is facilitated when the amount of similarity between stimuli is decreased. 
The finding that appears most consistently in the literature is that discrimination 
becomes more difficult if the similarity of the stimuli is increased” (Chapman 
and de Boer 1995: 249). Unusual stimuli that are more similar to the CS will 
trigger therefore stronger responses than those that are less similar on a given 
sensory modality and perceptual dimension. In this respect, an “animal might be 
able to track individual components of complex stimuli such as color, shape, 
and odor, and thus learn only those stimuli that most reliably predict a resource” 
(Smith 1993: 131). An organism’s ability to detect single components belong-
ing to different compounds, as in cases of salt, water or amino acids, might be 
responsible therefore for its proneness (in connection with physiological drives 
amplifying specific sensory discriminative thresholds) to adapt feeding habits to 
different foods, thereby starting up ecological changes and possibly exaptive 
evolutionary events. 
Thirdly, generalization is inferential, has a predictive value and is grounded 
on probability; thus, it meets some of the requirements of hypothetical reason-
ing. After having learned that a pattern of sensory stimulation predicts quite 
reliably certain outcomes, a subjects needs to identify future instances of the 
same pattern, while neglecting those that do not have predictive value. Since it 
is unlikely under natural conditions the exact reproduction of objects and 
events, animals must have mechanism for generalizing learned information, that 
is for extending what has been acquired by associative and instrumental learn-
ing to other cases than those previously experienced. Grounded on those 
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components of complex stimuli that grant favorable predictions, stimulus 
generalization recalls Peirce’s induction by qualities and therefore abduction. 
By classifying entities as token of types, it exploits formerly established 
connections between stimuli and rewards and between perceptions and actions, 
a temporal consequentiality that, according to Peirce, can be equated to logical 
reasoning. On this basis, the partial stability of the environment allows predic-
tion, while intermediate variability makes it unpredictable too. Eventually, the 
probable nature if stimulus generalization is well outlined by this Smith’s 
excerpt:  
 
For example, floral odors that foraging honeybees use to identify 
resources such as nectar and pollen are complex mixtures of many indi-
vidual odorants. Even among flowers that contain the resource, the exact 
composition of the odor signal may vary due to such factors as age, 
physiological condition, and genetic constitution. Under these conditions, 
a bee that constrains itself to search for the same complex of stimuli that 
it experienced from a flower at which it received a reward might, in the 
extreme, only revisit the flower it just depleted of resources. The bee 
would pass over many flowers of the same species that contain a reward 
but which vary slightly from the pattern given off by the flower at which 
the bee found nectar and/or pollen. In the other extreme, a bee that 
generalizes too broadly might visit every flower regardless of its species 
identity or reward potential; that is, it might not easily recognize stimuli 
that predict that a flower contains no pollen or nectar. (Smith 1993: 130) 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE CASE STUDY 
The introduction to my papers, in a more specific sense than its general func-
tion, is meant to be an hypothetical proposal concerning how blood-sucking 
might have developed from a perspective focusing on Peirce’s theory of signs 
and inference. The conjectural nature of the work is in line with the partial igno-
rance regarding the origin of hematophagy: “in most cases, the paleontological 
findings do not elucidate the initial phases of heamatophagy development in 
different taxa. Historically, the period of switching to blood-feeding appears to 
have been rather short as compared to the total duration of the taxon evolution, 
so that it left no traces in the paleontological history” (Balashov 1999: 945); 
hence, the result is that “even though the origin and evolution of heamatophagy 
in insects and ticks have been the topic of many publications, the hypotheses 
proposed are to a large extent speculative” (Balashov 1999: 950). 
Some points are nevertheless quite well shared among scholars. Firstly, 
“[t]he most essential prerequisites to the origin of heamatophagy were spatial 
contacts, trophic associations, and morphophysiological preadaptations” 
(Balashov 1999: 950). Secondly, as for the sensory system, “[i]nsects switched 
to haematophagy without developing new sensory organs” (Balashov 1999: 
945), thereby suggesting their adequacy to being extended or generalized in 
meeting the requirements of the new feeding habit. 
The plausibility or logical acceptability of the modeling attempt is grounded 
on the following argument: if hypothetical inference is based on a perceptive 
mechanism of iconic type and iconism involves generality, then generalization 
is the other side of the coin of abduction, which applies equally to animal sen-
sory and behavioral generalizations. In turn, since to generalize means and 
implies to coopt, abduction frames exaptation too. 
Such reasoning has been carried on starting from an historical overview of 
the basic idea underlying the coinage and adoption of the concept of exaptation, 
starting from Darwin himself; specific attention has been paid on Ch. Wright, 
because of his influence on the author of the Origin and the significance of his 
principle of new uses of old powers, whose elaboration was conceived to con-
trast detractors and critics of the new theory of natural selection. 
By comparing Wright to Peirce, emphasis has been put on the historical fact 
that exaptation and abduction did come to light in the same theoretical horizon 
and within the speculations of authors whose thoughts met on several points. 
Reasons explaining why, however, they never came in touch have been pro-
vided: chiefly, disagreements about the nature of Darwinism, Lamarckism, 
mind’s logic and the ability of organisms to shape their own evolution via life-
time behavioral choices. 
Next, Peirce’s evolutionism has been subjected to examination, especially 
insofar his acceptance of Lamarck’s theory of inheritance of acquired characters 
is concerned. From this it resulted an evolutionary pluralism broader than 
Wright’s account and to same extent closer to the current understanding. 
Peirce’s stress on behavior as a factor of evolution has switched the focus of 
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analysis on learning and inference, resulting in the tentative interpretation that 
his Lamarckism mirrored the working of hypothetical reasoning. To do this, the 
physiological corresponding of each inferential modality has been displayed, 
showing that abduction relies on iconic interpretations of perceived similarities 
among objects and, accordingly, that organisms’ habit taking can be formalized 
in the same manner. 
The concepts of mistake and substitution have been employed then as 
theoretical keys able, first, to provide a complementary understanding of 
(wrong) behavioral abductions; second, to report cases of sensory-driven 
changes of behaviors causing exaptation and thus, more generally, triggering 
new evolutionary directions; third, to prepare the final analysis of the case 
study. 
The section on technological development has further elaborated on the 
analogy between technology and biology, i.e. between tools and organs, this 
time testing the just achieved original idea of a deep sensory-based connection 
of abduction with exaptation on the results of my third article (Weible 2013); in 
this respect, this introduction and the third article mutually corroborate each 
other. 
The evolutionary hypothesis has been put on trial by choosing a case of 
exaptation — the origin of bloodsucking — and looking for clues able to con-
firm the presence of many or all the basic elements of the construct, such as 
mistakes, generalizations, objects similarities, behavior and learning, etc. To 
give a look as scientific as possible to a purely theoretical speculation, I have 
tested my abduction on the supposition of an isomorphism between abductive 
and exaptive sequences.  
As for behavior, there is consensus about the fact that it might have cana-
lized the changeover towards blood as a new source of food with the re-
functionalization or extension of existing biting and sucking mouthparts. 
Downes (1970) expresses himself in such terms; Waage (1979) speaks about 
behavioral prerequisites to hematophagy; Fenton (1992) refers to the flexibility 
of behavior in protovampire bats; Schutt (2008) suggests that a behavioral shift 
may have allowed carnivorous phyllostomids to exploit blood of larger mam-
mals; Bowman and Billeb (1965) maintain that behavioral predispositions 
account for occasional blood feeding in finches. Osche (2002: 15) is lapidary on 
the issue: “Transferring of existing (preadaptive) structures to new functions 
and roles requires changes in behaviour and implies, therefore, inclusion of an 
additional discipline into the synthetic view”. Fundamental is also the whole 
monograph (Schmitt 2002) dedicated to the “evolutionary ecology” of Gerd von 
Wahlert, with the participation of scholars whose viewpoint on evolution is 
expressly behavior-centered; for instance, in the words of Sudhaus (2002: 146): 
 
Fundamental in animals are “ethological key innovations” […] which 
allow them to exploit existing resources in new ways. Evolutionary 
change in behavior or physiology in order to exploit a new resource can 
put organisms and their preadaptive structures into a new ecological 
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situation. The changed behavior thus at first brings an extension of func-
tion, but then might also lead to an ecological change of function […]. In 
retrospect, such changes of behavior therefore end up being the "paceset-
ters of evolution" […]. They precede morphological changes and effect 
various alterations in structure as they influence the further direction of 
selection and evolution of characters. Organisms and all their properties, 
preadaptive and otherwise, are governed by new selective forces caused 
by a new relationship to their environment. Over many generations this 
leads to evolutionary change which improves the adaptations to the new 
mode of life; that means that they become more economical in terms of 
the energy output necessary to maintain them. "Ethological key innova-
tions'' are thus followed by adaptations in morphology to a new mode of 
life ("morphological key innovations" […]) 
 
As for errors in the pursuit of food, I have quoted many examples (Rothschild 
1957; Faúndez, Carvajal 2011; Baena 2011; Waage 1979; Lehane 2005; Bailey 
1936; Myers 1929), so that accidental biting of man and mammals by not 
hematophagous species is quite widespread a phenomenon. Besides, such possi-
bility is exactly what allows animal traps to work.  
In addition, animal mistakes synthetize the complementarity of generaliza-
tion and similarity. In electric mosquitoes traps, for instance, the usual associa-
tion in mammal hosts between carbon dioxide and blood, along with the alight-
ing behavior which is triggered, are extended and generalized (wrongly) to 
whatever emitting this particular molecule; in turn, mammals and cages do need 
to be similar in some respect to be interpreted iconically and substituted for 
each other. The relevance of similarity is thus twofold — perceptive and physi-
cal — and mirrors the very nature of Peirce’s metaphysical speculation on the 
correspondence between phenomenology and ontology (realism of the catego-
ries of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness). The actual sharing of properties 
among different objects is what makes the organism-environment coupling 
ambiguous and equivocal. Within a remarkable conceptual approach synthetiz-
ing perception, theory of signs as operational cues and psychological classical 
associationism, Tolman and Brunswik (1935: 53) claim that, in the relationship 
with objects, “univocal relations do not really obtain. Quite different discrimi-
nanda [perceivable objects properties, such as shape, color, size, etc.] may be 
coupled on different occasions with one and the same manipulanda [objects 
properties that allow behavioral manipulations]. Apples are sometimes red but 
they are also sometimes yellow”. Most important, “one and the same discrimi-
nanda will on different occasions be used as signs of different manipulanda. 
Brown is sometimes coupled with and used as a sign of chocolate but at other 
times it is coupled with and used as a sign of, say, a negro skin” (Brunswik 
1935: 54; emphasis mine”.  
Especially in lower living forms, generality and continuity of icons rest on 
the radical commonality of chemical-physical properties among world entities 
and events; but what enables organisms to establish reliable predictions depend-
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ing on such regularities is what makes them fallible too. There are “ambiguous” 
cues, which are caused with great frequency by both the given object and other 
objects, and “misleading” cues, which may be caused with little frequency by 
the given object and with great frequency by other objects. The implications are 
clear: 
 
Again, we would throw out the suggestion that the ambiguous and the 
misleading cues may for some individuals and under some conditions 
constitute a rather special common group to be designated as “hazard-
ous.” For both types of cue present a high degree of probability of leading 
the individual astray, i.e. of having been caused by other objects, C, D, E, 
etc. instead of the to-be-sought for good means-object B. (Hazardous 
cues would thus be analogous to "dangerous" means-objects). (Brunswik 
1935: 57) 
 
In animal perceiving and behaving, such concepts as generalization, mistake, 
and stimulus similarity are deeply interconnected; not by chance, when 
investigating unusual habits or accidental biting scientists are trying to find out 
which organic compounds, normally reacted to in ordinary searching, might 
have prompted the feeding attempts. In other words, salt, water, nucleotides and 
others, because of their widespread diffusion, provide ambiguous and mislead-
ing cues that support at the same time right inferences and wrong abductions.  
In line with Tolman’s and Brunswik’s framework and their recognition of 
the theoretical affinity between sign theory and classical psychology, literature 
on stimulus generalization confirms the connection and suggests how my pro-
posal concerning the possible perceptive origin of some of the evolutionary 
paths leading to the development of hematophagy could be translated 
experimentally. Studies on animal learning within the tradition of classical and 
operational conditioning have a well established empirical methodology which 
can be adopted to test in laboratory whether those free-living forms showing 
ecological and taxonomic affinities with existing vertebrate associates — for 
instance, members of Psocoptera, phytophagous and insectivorous Hemiptera, 
fruit-piercing Lepidoptera, etc. — can be induced to blood feeding through the 
manipulation of different attractants. Especially, the focus of research should 
fall on those free-living forms exhibiting no vertebrate associations but pos-
sessing preadaptive feeding structures or behavior, whose cooption should be 
verified (Arnold 1994; Pievani, Serrelli 2011) against adaptive hypotheses 
depending on natural selection. Besides, the occasional feeding habit thus 
induced should be proven to be enough stable over the generations grown in the 
laboratory to result in an “irreversible transformation” (Kull 2014) towards 
obligate parasitism. Eventually, all phases of insects feeding behavior 
(alighting, probing, piercing, sucking, tasting and gorging; cf. Chapman, Boer 
1995) should be scrutinized and tested to detect the exact point or points where 
the switch might have come about. The present work merely puts forward a 
plausible scenario and further research is needed. 
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8. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
My thesis claims the feasibility of Peirce’s theory of signs and inference to be 
applied to biology as a modeling device. More precisely, semiotics models 
evolution and the phenomenon of exaptation and proves itself useful in high-
lighting the perceptual dynamics involved in those behavioral modifications 
during organisms’ lifetimes liable to trigger new evolutionary trajectories. In 
this, it goes hand in hand with past and contemporary interpretations of this 
concept and makes a thread through the classical Darwinian, neo-Darwinian 
and post-Darwinian approaches. 
Reinterpretation and generalization of the concept of exaptation on the basis 
of signs theory and abduction have been achieved by historical and epistemo-
logical analysis. Historical research has led to the acknowledgment of the wide 
circulation of the precursory notion of preadaptation and similar principles in 
the earliest evolutionary biologists after Darwin’s revolution—even in the key 
texts of the modern evolutionary synthesis. Darwin himself owed some of the 
qualifications and corrections to his initial ideas to Ch. Wright’s principle of 
new uses of old powers. On the other hand, Wright and Peirce did know each 
other’s theories but neither came up with a comprehensive view able to join 
together coherently hypothetical inference and biological evolution: differences 
concerning the nature of mind and scientific thought on one side and the role 
and value of Lamarck’s theory on the other side kept them apart and didn’t 
favor the theoretical meeting. 
If restricted to indirect consequences of behavioral plasticity and learning 
(i.e., Baldwinian organic selection), Peirce’s Lamarckism does offer however 
all elements to accomplish the synthesis between abduction and exaptation: on 
one hand, it identifies with learning and can be interpreted like the extension of 
previously existing ideas or rules of action to new data or events and objects; on 
the other hand, once understood in Baldwinian terms, it is identical with a spe-
cific subtype of cooption phenomena driven by behavior. In either cases (by 
definition for abduction, supposedly for exaptation), perceptive similarity and 
its iconic interpretation or recognition are the key factors allowing the passage 
from one process to the other and grounding the modeling.  
The application of this reasoning to technological development and 
manufacturing is nothing but a corollary to the common iconic and abductive 
mechanism underlying human and animal learning plasticity. Indeed, on the 
basis of my generalization via Peirce’s signs theory, biological exaptation takes 
on the status of a case of ‘learning set transfer’ (Deacon 1997: 80). In this 
respect, there is no more appropriate way to conclude than taking a cue from 
Gould’s idea (Gould 2002: 1214–1218) that Nietzsche’s distinction between 
current utility and historical origin represents the best introduction possible to 
the theoretical importance of exaptation — the German philosopher is particu-
larly suitable to epitomize this research too, with a definition of knowledge as 
recognition that openly sums up the core of the several issues hitherto treated: 
“I take this explanation from the street; I heard one of the people say that ‘he 
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knew me right away’ — and I asked myself: what do the people actually take 
knowledge to be? what do they want when they want ‘knowledge’? Nothing 
more than this: something unfamiliar is to be traced back to something familiar. 
And we philosophers—have we really meant anything more by knowledge? 
(Nietzsche 2008: 214; § 355). 
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OVERVIEWS OF ARTICLES  
The main body of this thesis is composed of three articles, published between 
2012 and 2013. The first has framed the issue of exaptation with reference to 
semiotics and put forward the idea of a possible connection with Peirce’s 
theory. The second has investigated some perceptual aspects linked to evolution 
and cooption, thereby suggesting a way to properly set up the modeling. The 
third represents an attempt of generalization of re-functionalization phenomena, 
aiming at removing some of the usual distinctions between human and animal 
behavior. All three contain fundamental elements, precursors of the decisive 
hypothesis developed and tested in the present introduction, which constitutes 
to all effects the fourth and conclusive part of the research. 
 
I. The Concept of Exaptation between Biology and Semiotics. The paper 
introduces Gould’s and Lewontin’s criticism against Neo-Darwinism and the 
general principles of a post-Darwinian evolutionary biology and epistemology. 
Gould’s and Vrba’s seminal article on exaptation is presented, with a brief 
historical survey of its conceptual antecedents and emphasis on further develop-
ments, applications and experimental validation; besides, its articulation in a 
four-cases typology is illustrated. A casuistry of phenomena linked to exapta-
tion is reported, including the adoption of the notion in research fields other 
than evolutionary biology, such as linguistics, semiotics and biosemiotics. 
Eventually, Hoffmeyer’s in passing suggestion of a connection (likely meta-
phorical) between exaptation and abduction is taken concretely as the leading 
hypothesis guiding the whole research project and connected to Baldwin’s 
organic selection, so as to bring both back to the more inclusive topic of 
behavior. 
 
II. Ritualization and Exaptation: Towards a Theory of Hierarchical 
Contextuality? The paper translates the notion of ritualization into that of 
exaptation and focuses on the role of perception in affecting morphological and 
behavioral changes. Functional shifts of biological traits are reframed in terms 
of contextual changeovers and emphasis is put on the dialectics between initial 
cooption and subsequent adaptation, so as to integrate together classical 
Darwinism and post-Darwinian ideas. 
 
III. Approaching a Semiotics of Exaptation – Preliminary Reflections at 
the Intersection between Biological Evolution and Technological Develop-
ment. The paper clarifies what is meant by semiotic modeling of exaptation and 
elaborates on the common sense analogy between animal organs and human 
artifacts to address the issue. Arnold’s typology of exaptation is applied from 
biological evolution to technological development and parallels between the 
two domains are highlighted. Specifically, a genetic and pragmatic analogy is 
exposed: instruments and organs are similar in the way they are produced by 
(respectively) culture and nature on one hand and in the way they allow their 
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owners to actively mediate the relationship with the environment. A unifying 
formula on biological and technological functional changes is advanced, so as 
to define schematically first-use, addition and transfer exaptations and distin-
guish between non-adaptive and adaptive modifications. Conclusively, similari-
ties are shown between language and evolution as systemic and perception-
based phenomena. 
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SUMMARY  
The present dissertation attempts a modeling of the evolutionary (and semiotic) 
phenomenon of exaptation according to C. S. Peirce’s theory of signs and infer-
ence. In the first article I analyze the historical background from which the 
concept of exaptation comes out; along with presenting a synthetic overview of 
its application in research fields other than evolutionary biology, special atten-
tion is paid to its connection to semiotics and biosemiotics. In particular, the 
possible relation with both Peirce’s concept of abduction and J. M. Baldwin’s 
concept of organic selection is here first outlined. 
The second paper focuses on the possibility of organisms’ perceptive abili-
ties to trigger such evolutionary changeovers as the adoption of new functions 
for old traits. It relies on both classic ethological studies about ritualization and 
the notion of context as understood from a semiotic perspective. However 
implicitly, the role of Peirce’s theory of perception as inference becomes inte-
grated within the ontogenetic and phylogenetic dynamics between cooption and 
adaptation. 
My third work parallels the biological shaping of animal organs to the 
technological development of human artifacts. It draws a genetic (in the sense 
of origin) and pragmatic analogy between the two domains, so as to further 
corroborate Peirce’s idea of a substantial continuity between natural and 
intellectual products. Arnold’s typology of exaptation is applied to technology 
and a unifying formula on biological and technological functional changes is 
advanced. 
The Introduction to the three articles sums up the whole issue and estab-
lishes a common thread among the several topics addressed separately. Some 
deepening is provided for specific parts: attention is paid to the historical 
importance of Ch. Wright for both philosophy and biology and his relationship 
with Peirce is investigated; as for the latter, his specific position towards 
Darwinism and evolutionism is described and interpreted to make it compatible 
with modern understandings; most of all, a specific analysis of abduction high-
lights its perceptive, iconic and physiological aspects. Eventually, a final sec-
tion tests the hypothesis presented through a comparison with literature on the 
evolution of blood-sucking in insects. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Eksaptatsioon: ühe bioloogilise mõiste  
semiootilise kirjelduse poole 
Käesolev doktoritöö modelleerib eksaptatsiooni kui evolutsioonilist ja ühtaegu 
semiootilist nähtust, lähtudes C. S. Peirce’i märgi- ja tuletusteooriast. Esimeses 
artiklis analüüsitakse eksaptatsiooni mõiste ajaloolist tausta ning antakse sün-
teesiv ülevaade selle rakendustest väljaspool evolutsioonilist bioloogiat. Erilist 
tähelepanu pööratakse selle mõiste seostele semiootika ja biosemiootikaga. 
Tuuakse välja võimalik seos nii Peirce’i abduktsiooni mõiste kui Baldwini 
orgaanilise valiku mõistega. 
Teine artikkel keskendub organismi tajulisele võimele esile kutsuda evolut-
sioonilisi üleminekuid, omistades olemasolevatele tunnustele uusi funktsioone. 
Seejuures toetutakse nii klassikalistele etoloogia uurimustele rituaalidest kui ka 
konteksti mõiste semiootilistele käsitlustele. Peirce’i teooria tajust kui tuletusest 
seondub implitsiitselt ontogeneetilise ja fülogeneetilise dünaamikaga koopt-
siooni ja adaptatsiooni vahel. 
Kolmas artikkel tõmbab paralleele loomaorganite bioloogilise kujunemise ja 
inimese artefaktide tehnoloogilise arendamise vahel. Tuuakse välja geneetiline 
(algupära mõttes) ja pragmaatiline analoogia kahe valdkonna vahel, et tõestada 
Peirce’i ideed looduslike ja vaimsete nähtuste vahelisest olemuslikust pide-
vusest. Arnold’i eksaptatsioonitüpoloogiat rakendatakse tehnoloogiale ning 
arendatakse ühtset bioloogiliste ja tehnoloogiliste funktsionaalsete muutuste 
teooriat. 
Kolme artikli sissejuhatus võtab kogu teema kokku ja toob välja ühised 
jooned erinevate teemade vahel. Töö osadele antakse süvendatud ja üldistatud 
käsitlus: pööratakse tähelepanu Ch. Wright’i ajaloolisele tähtsusele nii bio-
loogia kui filosoofia jaoks, samuti tema seosele Peirce’iga. Kirjeldatakse ja 
tõlgendatakse tema erilist suhet darvinismi ja evolutsionismiga, et luua seos 
tänaste arusaamadega. Eelkõige toob spetsiifiline abduktsiooni analüüs välja 
selle tajulisi, ikoonilisi ning füsioloogilisi aspekte. Viimases osas testitakse 
hüpoteesi, tuginedes verd imevate putukate evolutsiooni alastele uurimustele. 
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